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"The Great Executive Hand of
Criminal Justice":t The Crime
Problem and the Activist Judge
By MARTIN LYON LEVINE*

Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright has completed over thirty years on
the federal bench.' His career as an appellate judge spans both what
has been called "the criminal law revolution,"2 and the so-called "war
on crime." 3 While public attention was concentrated during this period
on the "Warren era" of the United States Supreme Court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit-includWright-was in the vanguard of the
ing newly appointed Circuit Judge
4
battles over criminal law policy.
f Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Trials 1029, 1064 (1765).
* Professor of Law, and Professor of Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, University of Southern California Law Center and School of Medicine. I want to thank Jesse H.
Choper, John H. Ely, Walter Gellhorn, Leonard W. Ratner and Charles H. Whitebread for
their comments on an earlier draft of this article; Scott H. Bice for discussing the themes
with me; and Justice Robert S. Thompson for sharing his careful reading of the entire text.
1. J. Skelly Wright served from 1949-1962 as a United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. In 1962 he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and became Chief Judge for the D.C. Circuit in
1978.
2.

See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTER-

1960-1969 (1969). The "revolution" in the role of the Supreme Court, as some saw it,
was that it had "become an institution largely concerned with problems of individual liberty." Reich, _Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv. 673, 751
(1963). See also Dorsen, The ProperRole ofthe UnitedStates Supreme Courtin CivilLiberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 457,458 (1964) ("quiet judicial revolution"); Wright, Needfor
Educationin the Law of CriminalCorrection,2 VAL. U.L. REv. 84, 85 (1967). Cf. Pye, The
Warren Court and CriminalProcedure,67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 249 (1968) (quaer. "criminal
law revolution" or "orderly evolution toward the application of civilized standards"?).
3. For examples of the rhetoric employed by the "troops" in this "war," see the attacks
on criminal justice decisions from a law and order position which were a major part of the
1964 and 1968 presidential campaigns, T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, at
171-72, 218-60, 360, 363 (1969); Swindler, The Supreme Court, the Presidentand the Congress, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 671, 680 (1970).
4. The D.C. Circuit has been termed the "second most important court in the nation,"
one which "has always been unique among Federal courts of appeals" and "possesses the
broadest influence" of any of them. Its criminal law decisions have been said to have "inMATH
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Entick v. Carrington,5 the 1765 decision which was among the first
great modem criminal procedure cases, refers to the Chief Justice as
the "great executive hand of criminal justice." The phrase is an apt one
with which to honor Chief Judge Wright, who has indeed fulfilled a
judicial role of leadership in criminal justice. In addition, his thirtieth
year on the bench is a fitting occasion on which to review and honor his
cases, to examine the legitimacy of the role of the activist judge in criminal justice, and to consider the relation of that role to the problem of
crime.
Judge Wright's criminal procedure opinions demonstrate sound
judicial craftsmanship in the service ofjustice. A sampling of them will
be surveyed in section I of this article; two opinions, United States v.
Robinson6 and Zweibon v. Mitchell7 will receive particular attention
The cases surveyed suggest the jurisprudential stand Judge Wright
takes on the role of the jury in finding guilt and on the function of the
activist judge. They also exemplify his breadth of interest, his characteristic judicial style and his stand on basic Fourth Amendment issues.
Section II describes the experience of his first law clerk in Washington
and suggests the process whereby Judge Wright arrives at his decisions.
Section III attempts to place Judge Wright within a typology ofjudges.
The second half of this article attempts to answer two major criticisms leveled at those who, like Judge Wright, seek to effect criminal
justice by protecting the rights of suspects and defendants. Section IV
counters the argument that judicial activism is improper because courts
lack the requisite institutional competence and are a "deviant institution" in a democratic society. Courts are competent to defend individual rights and to rule on criminal law matters. They have a
constitutional mandate to protect the people against infringements on
liberty by police, prosecutor and legislative excess in criminal procedure; such protection is of the essence in a democratic society. Moreover, courts are not necessarily appreciably less democratic than the
legislature. This is especially so in the District of Columbia, where
neither is elected, and in many states, where both are elected. Section
V rebuts the "crime problem argument"-the argument that crime is so
urgent a problem that defendants' rights should be narrowly interfluenc[ed] both the Earl Warren Supreme Court and two generations of law professors."
Press, A Unique Court, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 99.
5. 19 How. St. Trials 1029 (1765).
6. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wright, J.) (plurality opinion), rev'd,414
U.S. 218 (1973).
7. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wright, J.) (plurality opinion).
8. See notes 112-73 and accompanying text supra.
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preted. The problem of ordinary crime--"crime in the streets"-is of
less apparent magnitude when viewed in the context of white collar and
other "invisible crime," as well as "candidate crimes," dangerous activities which are not yet viewed as criminal. Seen in context, the problem
of ordinary crime does not seem to justify a crusade devoted to the
single value of crime control. Those who shape the criminal process
are therefore required to consider a variety of competing utilitarian and
moral values, notably those manifested in the Bill of Rights.
I.
A.

Craftsmanship in the Service of Justice

The "Supreme Court" of the District of Columbia

Judge Wright has had to decide a wider range of criminal law issues than have most federal judges. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was for years a unique
criminal law court. The District has for generations lacked full powers
of self-government,9 and until 1970 felonies were prosecuted in the
United States District Court and the decisions of the District of Columbia local court system were subject to plenary review in the federal
courts.'" Judge Wright's court inherited the appellate jurisdiction of
the old Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.I Originally, it was
not a "circuit court of appeals," but simply the "Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia,"' 2 and its members were not "circuit judges"
but "justices." Not until 1948 was the District of Columbia made a
judicial circuit. 13 Even then, unlike the other ten circuit courts, the
District of Columbia retained its role as the highest court in its area,
14
still performing the role of the "supreme court" of the District.
17; cid. amend. XXIII. When incorporated in 1802,
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
Washington, D.C., had an elected city council as well as an appointed mayor. Congress,
however, reorganized the government in 1878, disenfranchising the predominantly black
residents, and establishing a board of three commissioners appointed by the President. The
primary legislative bodies for the District after this reorganization were the Senate and
House Committees on the District of Columbia; the budget power was exercised by the
District of Columbia Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriation Committees.
"Congress [was]. . . . in effect, the District of Columbia's combined 535-man city council
and state legislature" though it was elected by the citizens of the several states and District
residents had no vote in it. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRICr OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRIcT OF COLUMBIA 1 (1966) [hereinafter D.C. CRIME COMM'N].
10. 11 D.C. CODE ANN. § 321 (repealed 1970).

11. The old Supreme Court was established by Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, 12 Stat. 762.
12. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, 27 Stat. 434.
13. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 636, 62 Stat. 869 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 88 (1968)).
14. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 718 (1949); Fisher v. United States,
328 U.S. 463,476 (1946); District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.S. 698, 702 (1944); R. ROBERT-

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol 7:907

The court to which Judge Wright was appointed thus had both the

responsibility and the opportunity to confront the full range of criminal
procedure issues' 5 -unlike

other, more limited, federal courts. This

was true until 1970, when the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act16 abolished the District of Columbia Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction over the local Court of Appeals and 17made the
latter court the "highest court of the District of Columbia."
A comprehensive study of Judge Wright's contributions would
consider all of the hundreds of criminal procedure cases he has heard.' 8
Since such a full review is not feasible in this article, a sample will be
discussed. A first group of cases illustrates some of his jurisprudential
stands on the role of the judge and jury and the issue of guilt. A second

group of cases suggests his style of reasoning and the breadth of his
concern in criminal procedure. A third group of cases reveals his position on fundamental issues of the Fourth Amendment.
B.

Responsibility of Jury and Judge

Several cases illustrate Judge Wright's conception that the role of
the jury in criminal law adjudication encompasses a responsibility to

pass upon both moral as well as legal guilt. Thus it is his position that
the jury's function cannot be usurped by experts. When McDonaldv.
United States 9 was decided, explaining the Durham20 rule on insanity,2 ' Judge Wright was new to the court and had not participated in
SON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 356
(2d ed. 1951).
15. The City of Washington, D.C., with a population of over halfa million, seven out of
ten black, many of them poor, generated law enforcement issues typical of American cities.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES SUMMARY (1970).
16. 11 D.C. CODE ANN. § 301 (1970).
17. Id. § 102. In Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), the Supreme Court
held that Congress has article I power to establish a court system in the District of Columbia.
18. It should be noted here that Judge Wright has contributed to the criminal law not
only through his opinions, but also through his scholarship. He has produced a body of
work that stamps him as a leader in the academic community. He has been especially productive in the field of criminal law. See Appendix A.
19. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per curiam).
20. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
21. In Durham, the court decided that "existing tests of criminal responsibility are obsolete and should be superseded." Id. at 864. It adopted the rule that "[A]n accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or mental
defect." Id. at 874-75. See also Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
explaining that the term "product" involved a "but for" test. Id. at 617. The DurhamCarter test was overruled in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
bane), adopting the American Law Institute's insanity test, but retaining the McDonalddefinition of mental disease and defect.
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its many previous insanity decisions, yet he played a leading role in
formulating the court's per curiam opinion.2 2 McDonald established a
legal definition of mental disease or defect independent of any psychiatric definition.23 It was intended to enable the jury to reach its own
conclusion on the ultimate issue, rather than having to rely on conclusory psychiatric testimony.24 Nor is the jury's responsibility to be
invaded by the trial judge. Despite long and widespread use, and
Supreme Court provenance, of the controversial Allen charge,25 Judge
Wright dissented from its approval in Jenkins v. UnitedStates.2 6 When
juries are slow to bring in a verdict, Allen authorizes the judge to call
them back to the courtroom for the additional instruction. Judge
Wright described the Allen charge as a "dynamite charge" designed to
"blast loose a deadlocked jury"27 by pressuring the minority to yield.
He regarded the Allen charge as interfering with the proper independence of jurors.2 8
The moral component of a verdict of guilt was recognized by
Judge Wright in United States v. Bailey,2 9 a recent case raising a duress-compulsion defense to an escape charge. He considered whether
the prisoner's intent was to escape lawful confinement, or to escape
from the particular conditions of which he complained. Judge Wright
declared that recognition of such a defense stemmed in part from "the
desire to have one human element of 'blameworthiness' as a basis for
punishment" on the escape charge.30
22. Judge Wright has written: "When I first joined the Court of Appeals, it was deeply
divided over an attempt to elaborate a definition of mental disease, as that term is used in
the insanity defense. As a newcomer to the court, I was cast to some extent in the role of
mediator. I worked individually with each of the eight other judges on the court, and ultimately we forged a resolution of the problem, to which each judge contributed. In working
on that case, line by line and word by word, I had my introduction to the problem [of
insanity]... ." Wright, A Colleague'r Tribute to Judge David L Bazelon, on the TwentyFifth Anniversary ofhis Appointment, 123 U. PA. L. REv.250, 252 (1974) (footnote omitted).
23. "[A]ny abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." 312 F.2d at 851.
24. See also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon,
J.) (instructing psychiatric experts to testify in nonconclusory terms).
25. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
26. 330 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
27. 330 F.2d at 222 n.4 (quoting Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.
1962)). See also Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1961).
28. Use of this type of instruction in the District of Columbia was, years later, restricted
to an ABA-recommended version. United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
29. 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
30. Id. at 1092-93 (quoting United States v. Nix, 501 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1974)). See
Arnold, CriminalAttempts-The Rise andFallofan Abstraction,40 YALE L.J. 53, 69 (1930).
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Another early case similarly illustrates Judge Wright's conviction
that the jury is entitled to vote on the ultimate issue of moral guilt. In
Everest v. United States,3 1 a defendant who had pled guilty thereafter
sought to withdraw his plea and stand trial before a jury, though he did
not deny the crime. Canvassing case law and articles on the role of the
jury as the representative of the people's conscience, Judge Wright
wrote that a "modem Jean Vajean" should be allowed to present to
the jury his argument that, notwithstanding the commission of the acts
32
charged, he deserved a verdict of acquittal.
In addition to moral guilt, of course, actual legal guilt of the crime
charged is a prerequisite to conviction. Judge Wright thus also attempts to make sure that defendants are not prejudiced by procedural
errors. In Powell v. UnitedStates,33 Judge Wright expressed horror that
innocent people might be convicted because of the five month interval
between the series of narcotics buys and the arrests. So many months
after the alleged offense, the officer might be mistaken in identifying
suspects, and innocent defendants would have difficulty in establishing
alibis. 34 In Oliver v. UnitedStates,3 a multiple rape case, Judge Wright
remarked that "sordid," "inflammatory" and "reprehensible" offenses
understandably spur police and prosecutor retribution and tempt them
to relax procedural safeguards. "[lilt is in just such cases," said Judge
Wright, "that the need for a trial according to law is most compelling."3 6 Excessive zeal may lead to illegal investigative action and gross
procedural error, which in turn may lead to conviction of the innocent.
Judge Wright is an activist judge; he has wryly commented that he
is probably the only circuit judge in the country who can view Judge
David Bazelon as, by comparison, a conservative .3a An early example
of this relationship is Cephus v. United States.3 s At trial, there had been
gaps in the government's case-in-chief and the trial judge thus committed error in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal following the close of the prosecution's case. 39 Nevertheless,
when the defendant took the stand and closed the gaps with his own
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Id. at 984-87 (Wright, J., dissenting).
352 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id. at 710 (Wright, J., dissenting).
335 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Id. at 729 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Wright, supra note 22, at 250.
324 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
See FED. R. Cram. P. 29(a).
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testimony, under the waiver doctrine no reversible error remained.4 °
Judge Bazelon's majority opinion, while criticizing the general rule,
stated that "nevertheless, we need not here question the entire waiver
doctrine in criminal cases," 4 1 and decided the case on a narrower
ground. Judge Wright, though concurring in Judge Bazelon's opinion,
characteristically took a broad view and added that in his judgment,
"the waiver doctrine is without validity in any case," because it allowed
the prosecutor to wait "hopefully for [the defendant] to convict him42

self."

Judicial activism is far broader than judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. Judge Wright employs a variety of sources of
authority for his activism, as exemplified by Washington v. Clemmer.43
In that case, the court reformed the District's conduct of preliminary
hearings. An indigent defendant, charged with the capital offense of
abetting a rape, had been denied a free subpoena to call the prosecutrix
as witness at the preliminary hearing to test whether she could identify
him. Defendant's request that a stenographic record of the hearing be
made had also been denied. The per curiam opinion, in which Judge
Wright took the leading role, invoked both the court's supervisory
power over the administration of criminal justice in the District,' and
constitutional case law, to require stenographic recording of hearings.
The right of an indigent defendant to free subpoenas for his witnesses
was declared on the basis of a third source of authority: interpretation
of the Federal Rules.45 The court's role in this case is manifestly activist, carrying into effect its understanding of a just administration of
criminal law, yet it is typical that no confrontation with the legislature
was required.
Judge Wright's activist concern with the development of the law is
manifested also through another technique not requiring judicial confrontation with the legislature. He often highlights an issue raised in a
case, which need not be then decided; such judicial attention implicitly
invites trial counsel in later cases to recognize and preserve the point,
and future appellate counsel to brief it. For example in UnitedStates v.
Fearwell,4 6 a case dealing with impeachment of a witness-defendant,
40. See generally Comment, The Motionfor Judgment of Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard,70 YALE L.J. 1151 (1961).
41. 324 F.2d at 897.
42. Id. at 898.
43. 339 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
44. See generally note 14 and accompanying text supra.
45. 339 F.2d at 718-19. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 5(c), 17(a), 17(b).
46. 595 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Judge Wright noted the distinction between the general rule on harmless error4" and the more stringent harmless error rule for constitutional
violations.4 8 He raised the question whether a strict rule of harmless
error might be appropriate for denial of rights created by statute.
Judge Wright also acknowledges that the force of precedent sometimes ties the judge's hands. In Williams v. United States,4 9 Judge
Wright, concurring, was concerned with the imposition of consecutive
sentences under different statutes for the same narcotics transaction.50
Noting that the issue was governed by a recent Supreme Court 5-4 decision, Gore v. United States,5 1 he flagged the issue for possible certiorari by quoting from the concurring opinion in Gore at the circuit level:
"'Unless we are freed from the controlling effects of [the precedents],
we have no choice but to countenance the sentences here imposed.' "52
Judge Wright rarely votes to overrule a governing precedent even
of his own court, and is known to believe that, in general, a judge has a
special responsibility to follow his own prior opinions, to maintain consistency within his own "jurisprudence." Judge Wright, moreover, is
not one to be dissuaded by the mere disagreement of others. Yet, on
reflection and with additional experience with a rule, he has shown the
flexibility to reverse his own stand. Thus, in United States v. Sheppard,53 he wrote the court's opinion abolishing the rule which required
corroboration of the testimony of the rape victim. Among the long line
of District of Columbia cases thus overruled was Franklin v. United
States,54 a multiple rape case where he had written reaffirming that
rule.
C.

A Sample of Cases
A cross-section of other criminal procedure opinions written by

47. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
48. Compare Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (no "reasonable possibility" that
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction) with Schneble v. Florida,
405 U.S. 427 (1972) and Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (independent evidence
of guilt was "overwhelming").
49. 332 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
50. .d. at 309 (Wright, J., concurring). Defendant was convicted on six counts arising
from two sales of heroin on the same day, to the same purchaser, in the same location. On
two of the counts, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences, five years plus one to three
years. The panel majority, Burger and McGowan, JJ., affirmed without opinion. Id. at 308.
51.

357 U.S. 386 (1958).

52. 332 F.2d at 309 (quoting Gore v. United States, 244 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(Bazelon, J., concurring), aI'd,357 U.S. 386 (1958)).
53. 569 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
54. 330 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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Judge Wright reveals certain characteristic interests and judicial styles.
A number of cases, for example, reveal his concern for factual accuracy, his treatment of presumptions, and "strict construction" of law
and fact. Other cases demonstrate that he is equally at home with technical doctrines as he is with considerations of policy and of intuitive
common sense. He also is willing to explicitly take into account the
result of his decision on the actual parties involved.
Judge Wright is careful to ensure that factual assumptions and inferences made by the court are supported or required by the record. He
employs a "strict construction 5' 5 of the facts to avoid drawing inferences prejudicial to the defendant which are not required by the record.
In UnitedStates v. Henry,5 6 for example, Judge Wright applied the rule
of Lynch v. Overholser,57 which held that summary commitment may
be imposed on a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity only
if the defendant himself has raised the insanity defense. In Henry, the
record showed that defense counsel had at least acquiesced in the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. But Judge Wright would not
permit summary commitment absent a formal plea raising the insanity
defense or an explicit act by the defendant, since summary commitment deprives the mentally ill person of the normal procedural safeguards of civil commitment. Similarly, in Cross v. United States,5 8
Judge Wright would not lightly infer that a defendant had waived his
right to be present at trial, merely on the basis of his disruptive behavior.
In other cases, Judge Wright has avoided factual assumptions,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in the absence of a sufficient record; like other modern judges he instead remands for a specified factual
finding. For example, in Fearwell,5 9 the trial judge had ruled that the
defendant's prior conviction could be used to impeach his credibility if
he took the stand; the defendant had therefore not testified. Judge
Wright remanded to see what the testimony would have been, so that a
judgment of prejudice or harmless error could be factually grounded.
6 ° a rape victim's identification of the accused had not been
In Franklin
corroborated, and the court therefore held that there was insufficient
evidence to convict. Judge Wright remanded with permission that a
new trial be held, rather than merely reverse, so that if corroboration
55.

1972).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See J.

SUTHERLAND,

STATUTES

600 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
369 U.S. 705 (1962).
325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
595 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
330 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

464 (4th ed.

916
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61
existed it could be produced.
Other cases also show Judge Wright's unwillingness to make factual assumptions without a basis in the record. The District of Columbia Circuit faced a number of cases where narcotics undercover officers
delayed for several months after making a narcotics buy before arresting the defendants. In Powell,62 Judge Wright, dissenting, would have
followed recent precedent and remanded for a factual hearing on the
reasonableness of the delay and the prejudice to the defendant. In Oliver,6 3 a multiple rape case, a detective testified that he had made the
arrest on the basis of an outstanding warrant of which he had personal
knowledge. After oral argument in the court of appeals, Judge Wright
directed the clerk to request the Government to produce for judicial
notice the warrant and the official records showing the contemporaneous basis of the arrest. The Government replied that "It now appears
that no such warrant or complaint was in existence, despite the detective's testimony that he knew such a warrant did exist," 6 a response
demonstrating the soundness of Judge Wright's approach.
Judge Wright is as at home with technical arguments of substantive or procedural criminal law as he is with policy analysis, following
the logic of the law wherever it leads, whether to the government's or
the defendant's benefit. In Bailey,65 for example, the defendant was
charged with escape from the custody of the Attorney General. He
argued that at the time of escape he was instead in the custody of the
courts, since he had been brought to Washington by a writ of habeas
corpus ad test#'candum. Judge Wright rejected this argument, based
upon technical reasoning as well as "intuitive sense" and "considerations of policy and common sense." 66 In Franklin,' Judge Wright
again found that technical arguments supported the government's position. In his opinion, while noting problems of duplicity and misjoinder
in the indictment of multiple defendants for rape, he held for the government on those issues because they had not been timely raised.6
Evidentiary rules may also be strictly construed to protect defend-

61. Id. at 209. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 1223 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(en bane) (Wright, J., dissenting) (no remand for fact finding there required); see note 124,
infra.
62. 352 F.2d at 710-11 (Wright, J., dissenting).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

335 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Id. at 729 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd,444 U.S. 394 (1980).
585 F.2d at 1103-04.
330 F.2d 205. See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
330 F.2d at 206-07.
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ants' rights. In Fearwell,6 9 for example, Judge Wright narrowly read
the Luck rule,7" which specified the type of prior conviction which may

be used to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant.71
Judge Wright considers it legitimate for the court to take into account, in certain ways, the effect of the decision on the individuals involved. Thus, in Oliver,7 2 the rape case mentioned above, he declared
that "[w]here the appellants, all youths, have been given maximum

sentences of 30 years and 15 years, a close look at the record is in order."' 73 Similarly, in a noncriminal case discussed in the next section,
he declared that, in the case of doubt, he would vote to save the life of
the individual involved in the case, rather than permit death.7 4
Judge Wright has also considered the equities of a case in another

context. While not suggesting that he would withhold the benefit of75a
legal doctrine from even a clearly guilty defendant, if it were the law,
Judge Wright has declared his view, in Gilliam v. United States,7 6 that

the conviction of such a defendant is not the proper occasion on which
to make major changes in a doctrine. "Only the overwhelming proof of

guilt makes this an inapproporiate [case]
for breaking new ground by
'77
imposing this prophylactic sanction.
D.

Judge Wright and the Fourth Amendment
Any sampling of Judge Wright's criminal procedure cases reveals

his contribution to Fourth Amendment law. A great controversy in this
area is the relative authority of judges and police. Issues arise concern-

ing the exclusionary rule, arrests, wiretaps and, above all, searches.
69. 595 F.2d 771. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
70. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
71. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Belt, 514
F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc); FED. R. EVID. 609(a); J. WEiNSTEIN, EVIDENCE § 609
(1975); McGowan, Impeachment of CriminalDefendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 LAW &
SOC'L ORDER 1.

72. 335 F.2d 724.
73. Id. at 729 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), rehearingdenied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
75. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), the Court cautioned that the entrapment defense may not be available when the defendant has committed "heinous" or
"revolting" crimes. Id. at 451.
76. 323 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
77. Id. at 616 (Wright, J., concurring). This suggestion in Gilliam is no mere harmless
error rule since Judge Wright was suggesting that in egregious cases dismissal might be
proper even if the violation of rights bore no fruit in evidence.
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1. ExclusionaryRule
a.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

One of Judge Wright's first Fourth Amendment cases was Killough
v. UnitedStates,78 heard by the court en bane. The defendant had been
convicted of manslaughter for strangling his wife, based in part on an
oral confession given the day after he had made a written confession.
The written confession was inadmissible because it had been obtained
during an illegal delay following his arrest. 9 Both the majority opinion, by Judge Fahy, and Judge Wright's concurrence' ruled that the
oral reaffirming confession was also inadmissible as a fruit of the inadmissible confession.8 Judge Wright's separate opinion went farther
than the majority in finding that the victim's corpse, discovered as a
result of the confession, must also be suppressed. The vehement dissent
of then Circuit Judge Burger is discussed below. 82
b.

"Must the Criminal Go Free...

?"

A major controversy in Fourth Amendment law is exemplified by
Cardozo's widely-quoted gibe at the exclusionary rule, "Must the criminal go free because the constable has blundered?" 3 In Gilliam v.
United States, 4 Judge Wright hinted at a wholly different approach to
judicial control of police and trial judge behavior than that which exists
in law today. In "reluctantly" concurring to affirm the conviction, he
wrote:
When police brutality and judicial intemperance resulting in a
denial of due process of law appear in a criminal proceeding, it
may well be that responsible administration of justice requires
that the proceedings be set at naught, even though the brutality
and intemperance cannot be shown to have infected the trial it78. 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (hereinafter cited as Killough I).
79. United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961). See Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); FED. R. CRAM. P. 5(a).
80. 315 F.2d at 248 (Wright, J., concurring).
81. The majority opinion distinguished Jackson v. United States. 285 F.2d 675 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), ceri. denied, 366 U.S. 941 (1961) (Warren, C.J. and Douglas, J., would have
granted cert.) and Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 863 (1960). See also Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc).
In Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (hereinafter cited as Killough II), the conviction was again reversed, on the grounds that a third confession should
also have been excluded, having been given as part of a "confidential jail classification interview." Id. at 935.
82. See note 230 and accompanying text infra.
83. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
84. 323 F.2d 615.
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85

self.
Judge Wright's Gilliam opinion is at variance with the prevailing
law. The exclusionary rule will overturn convictions if illegally seized
evidence is used,8 6 but does not concern itself with illegal practices
against the defendant which yield no courtroom evidence. 87 He thus
goes beyond existing law in suggesting that the courts respond to illegal
official practices whether or not evidence is produced by the illegal activity. He also goes beyond existing law in suggesting that in extreme
cases the accused should be set free, rather than merely remanding for
a new trial which would exclude certain evidence. Judge Wright's view
may be compared to the minority theory of entrapment, which focuses
on whether the police tactics are abhorrent. 8
The Gilliam approach is one Judge Wright would restrict to extreme cases. In Killough I,89 Judge Wright explicitly rejected an automatic rule that because a suspect has been illegally detained and has
confessed, he must be set free, immune from all further prosecutions
for the crime. He wrote that "we cannot ignore the public safety in our
attempt to correct police wrongdoing." 90
Judge Wright has adopted both of the competing rationales offered for the exclusionary rule. In his separate opinion in Killough I,
he expressed the view that deterrence of official misconduct is part of
the rationale for appellate reversals. 9 ' In Killough I, Judge Wright
acknowledged the other major rationale for the exclusionary rule-that
"the courts themselves [not become] accomplices in willful disobedience of law." 92 Similarly, in O/iver,93 the multiple rape case, Judge
85. Id. at 616 (Wright, J., concurring).
86. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

87. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1866).
"Under the exclusionary rule, judicial attention focused upon the evidentiary product of the
[police] practices... rather than upon the practices themselves." Amsterdam, The Rights of
Sus.pects, in RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 401, 404
(N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
88. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 498 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 437 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sherman v.

United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S.
413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In the majority view in each of the entrapment
cases, the question is phrased in terms of the defendant's predisposition rather than the
officer's conduct.
89. 315 F.2d 241.
90. Id. at 249 (Wright, L., concurring).
91.

Id.

92. 336 F.2d at 936 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)).
93. 335 F.2d 724.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:907

Wright quoted from the Supreme Court's opinion in Elkins v. United
States, regarding "'the imperative of judicial integrity, "94 as well as
Holmes' dictum that "'no distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge.'
"9

2. Arrests

Judge Wright has stood out from the mass of judges in his view of
the law of arrest warrants. While the "cardinal rule" of searches is that

a warrant ordinarily must be obtained, the traditional rule regarding
arrests is to the contrary. Until recently the law had developed such

that a policeman could arrest for every serious crime, on his own determination of probable cause. Thus the requirement of arrest warrants
had almost been read out of the Fourth Amendment.9"
Judge Wright was one of the few judges to question the reduction
of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to a nullity in arrest
situations. 97 He supported a rule that, if there was time to obtain an

arrest warrant, one would be required, just as a search warrant was
required for searches. Writing for the panel in Gatlin v. United
States,9" he noted concern for the failure there to obtain an arrest warrant: "This failure alone, absent exceptional circumstances, may be
sufficient to invalidate this arrest." 99 The issue came before the court en
94. 335 F.2d at 733 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960)).
95. 335 F.2d at 733 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Olinstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
96. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 28 n.15 (1972). It is
accepted that at common law constables had the power to arrest for felonies on probable
cause, without judicial authorization. Though the definition of felony changed from crimes
punishable by death to crimes calling for imprisonment over a year, and though for the first
time paid police forces were established, continuation of the common law power was never
seriously challenged. Arrests without warrants have long been allowed when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a felony, regardless of whether there is
time first to obtain a warrant. Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention,
Questioning and Frisking of Suspected PersonsandPolice Arrest Privilegesin General,51 J.
CRIM. L.C.&P.S. 386, 388 (1960).
97. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480, 497-98 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500-03 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 489-92 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948); Carter v. United States, 314 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1963); Hopper v. United States, 267 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1959); Clay v. United States, 239 F.2d 196 (5th
Cir. 1956); Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in FaithandHope, 42 NEB. L. REv.
483, 501 (1963).
98. 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
99. Id. at 67 n.10.
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banc in Ford v. United States.1°° The majority held that arrest warrants were never required for felony arrests, although they were preferable. Judge Wright, concurring, said: "In the present state of the law
this ruling is undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, I have no doubt that
before too long personal liberty will be accorded the same protection
under the Fourth Amendment as the ownership and possession of
' 1 He hoped that "the disreputable and unconproperty now enjoys." 10
stitutional practice of arresting for investigation and interrogation
would be discouraged."'' 0 2 Similarly, in Gatlin and in Oliver, he had
of invescondemned arrests without probable cause, made for purposes
03
tigation, as flagrant violations of the Fourth Amendment.1
The prediction Judge Wright made in Fordhas so far proven only
partly correct. When the issue of warrantless arrests reached the
Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Watson,"° the Court held the traditional rule to be constitutional. Nevertheless, the Court has subsequently-and for the first time-required that arrest warrants be used
for certain felony arrests, when made in the home.' 0
3.

Wiretaps

Judge Wright has written some of the leading contemporary cases
° for example,
on wiretaps and bugging. In United States v. Ford,"
Judge Wright held that entries by government agents to plant listening
devices would violate the Fourth Amendment unless authorized by a
by adequate affidavits. 107 The
particularized judicial order supported
08
Supreme Court later disagreed.
Judge Wright wrote the plurality opinion for the court en banc in
Zweibon v. Mitchell,'° a case which will be discussed in more detail.
The Jewish Defense League (JDL) had been demonstrating against Soviet policy, and its headquarters was tapped by the FBI under order of
Attorney General Mitchell. The JDL sued Mitchell and the FBI agents
for damages. The defendants claimed that there was inherent constitutional authority for the President to authorize surveillance without a
100.
101.
102.
103.

352 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc).
Id. at 936 (Wright, J., concurring).
Id. at 935.
Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d at 670-72; Oliver v. United States, 335 F.2d at 729-

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

423 U.S. 411 (1976).
Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id. at 154-55.
See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

31.
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judicial warrant, based on his powers to protect national security and
conduct foreign affairs. In the Keith" O case, the Supreme Court had
held that there was no such executive authority when the threat to national security involved a purely domestic organization, but had reserved the question of taps based on threats involving foreign
powers."
In Zweibon, Judge Wright declared, in dictum, his belief that, absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic surveillance is unconstitutional." 2 Thus he would have broadly applied the "cardinal
rule" to this area. He held, more narrowly, that even though a threat
from a foreign power was involved, the tapping of an organization like
the JDL, which was not a collaborator or agent of a foreign power, fell
on the "domestic" rather than the "foreign" side of the Keith line. A
judicial warrant was thus required. Nevertheless, Judge Wright held
that if the defendants could prove a subjective good faith belief that
their acts had been constitutional under the claimed inherent powers of
the president,
the court would recognize such a defense in the damage
3
action."
Judge Wright's position is that the government was instituted to
secure fundamental personal liberties for its citizens. It is the exercise
of these rights which makes the nation worth defending. Notwithstanding executive claims that it was acting to protect the "national
security," Judge Wright declared that the judiciary must remain "vigilantly prepared to fulfill its own responsibility to channel Executive ac' 4
tion within constitutional bounds." "
Rejecting the standard of "overall reasonableness," Judge Wright
thus applied to the issues framed in the case the cardinal rule that a
warrant is required wherever practicable." 5 He cited the familiar rationale of Johnson v. UnitedStates," 6 that a neutral and detached magistrate should make such decisions, and that they should not be made
by executive officials engaged in investigative and prosecutorial du7
ties." 1
110.
111.
112.
113.

United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
Id. at 321-22.
516 F.2d at 614.
Id. at 670-71.

114. Id. at 604-05. See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (Warren,
C.J.).

115. 516 F.2d at 631.

116. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
117. 516 F.2d at 614.
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Echoing Entick v. Carrington, 18 Judge Wright declared that an
unconstitutional practice of the executive, no matter how inveterate,
cannot be accepted by the judiciary as limiting the citizen's constitutional rights; I 9 the "spirit and purpose" of the Fourth Amendment required closing areas of purportedly nonreviewable executive
prerogative, rather than extending them.' 2
Judge Wright's analysis required that the court consider whether
the need to obtain a warrant would frustrate a legitimate governmental
He used a balancing approach, considering the importance of
goal.'
the information sought by the government, the availability of less intrusive means, and the degree to which the surveillance of a particular
scope and duration infringed on individual rights.'2 2
4. Searches
United States v. Robinson' was a case which the court thought
provided "an appropriate vehicle for rational definition of the scope of
personal searches incident to lawful arrest."' 2 4 After its first remand,
the case was reheard before the court of appeals en bane; Judge Wright
wrote for four members of the court, holding the search unconstitutional and reversing.' 5
The car driven by Willie Robinson had been stopped for a "routine spot check" by Officer Jenks of the Washington police. Subsequently, Officer Jenks checked the police traffic records and discovered
that Robinson's operator's permit had been revoked. A few days later,
Officer Jenks saw Robinson driving the same car and arrested him for
operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his operator's permit, and
for obtaining a new permit by misrepresentation. District of Columbia
police regulations require that suspects arrested for such offenses be
taken into custody and brought to the police station; moreover, the of118. 19 How. St. Trials 1029 (1765).
119. 516 F.2d at 616.
120. Id. at 619 n.67.
121. Id. at 632-33.
122. Id. at 657-58.
123. 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'don rehearing,471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
124. 447 F.2d at 1223. Robinson's first appeal was heard by a panel which reversed by a
vote of 2-1; thereafter the case was reheard en bane before the nine judges of the circuit.
Judge McGowan's majority opinion remanded the case to the district court for a supplemental evidentiary inquiry on the motion to suppress, to produce "an authentic version of what
actually happened," including information on "the operational problems and policies of the
police in the field." Judge Wright, dissenting from the order to remand, would have found
as a matter of law that the search was unconstitutional, even resolving all factual discrepencies in favor of the Government. Id. at n.1 (Wright, J., dissenting).
125. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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ficer was required to make a "thorough search" of the suspect upon
arrest.126 In complying with the search regulations, Officer Jenks detected an object in Robinson's breast pocket. While there was no indication that he thought it might be a weapon, Jenks nevertheless took
the object from Robinson's pocket, and discovered it to be a waddedup cigarette package. He then opened it and found fourteen gelatin
capsules of heroin; Robinson was arrested for possession of narcotics,
27
and at trial, moved to suppress evidence of the narcotics.
Officer Jenks had conducted a full search of the person incident to
a lawful arrest for violation of a motor vehicle regulation, and the issue
before the court28 was the lawfulness of such searches of motorists without a warrant.
a.

Step-by-Step Analysis

Judge Wright's approach to Fourth Amendment issues is to require a step-by-step analysis of the officer's conduct. His study of the
facts in Robinson 129 highlighted three distinct steps in the officer's
search. The first was the frisk, which Judge Wright ruled lawful. The
second was the removal of the cigarette package. The third step was
the search inside the cigarette package itself.
b. The "Cardinal Rule" and Allocation of Responsibility
Judge Wright focused his attention on the Fourth Amendment
mandate that "[o]rdinarily, a warrant must be obtained by a police officer before he may make a search." 3 ' Judge Wilkey's dissent points
3
out that this is not in point of fact so-" 'Ordinarily' just isn't true".' '
Warrantless searches incident to arrest are vastly more common than
searches made with warrants.1 32 But Judge Wright was not disputing
this fact; rather, he made the starting point of his Fourth Amendment
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

471 F.2d at 1088.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1088-90.
Id. at 1090 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1113 n.7 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).

132.

Id

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-

DURE 157 (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1972); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONsTrrU-

TIONAL INTERPRETATION 38-44 (1969). Telford Taylor has argued that searches incident to
arrest were the fiorm at common law, and searches under warrant the exception. He concludes that the Framers of the Constitution were concerned with limiting warrants, not with
limiting warrantless searches through the device of warrants. However, as Professor Taylor
recognizes, arrest searches without warrants at that time involved "dangerous cutthroat[s]"
and similar felons who were the objects of "hue and cry" or "hot pursuit." Id. at 39.
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analysis the "cardinal rule" that warrants are the rule, and searches
without warrants, the exception. 133 The theory underlying the rule is
that enunciated in Johnson v. UnitedStates.'3 4 In words that have been
quoted and requoted both by Judge Wright and by the Supreme Court:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. . .When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement

agent. 135
The "point of the Fourth Amendment" is thus, to Judge Wright, a distribution of power. Though magistrates' approval of warrants is often
routine to the point of being a rubber-stamp, 136 the warrant requirement nevertheless facilitates after-the-fact review by a judge in a suppression hearing because it mandates a prior sworn statement of police
justification. 137 Believing in the primacy of judicial authority to determine the legitimacy of police searches, Judge Wright concluded in
incident to arrest,
Robinson that warrantless searches, such as those
138
must be reviewed by courts "with special care."
c.

Probable Cause and the Scope of Search
Judge Wright adamantly believes that searches may not be carried

133. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specially established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967). Judge Wright rejects the method which determines the overall "reasonableness"
of a warrantless search by balancing the values involved in the individual case, and he
adopts instead the cardinal rule which requires a warrant when there is time to obtain one.
Nevertheless, he recognizes that the "values implicated by the category of cases," including
the one at hand, are balanced by the court in formulating the applicable overall rule.
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 631 n.91.
134. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
135. Id. at 13-14.
136. See Note, Scope Limitationsfor Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 436-

37 (1969).
137. Id See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1962); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
138. 471 F.2d at 1091. Judge Wright takes as his model the Fourth Amendment warrant
procedure, wherein the court scrutinizes the justification for a particular search on its own
facts. Id. at 1087-109. In contrast, Judge Wilkey, who dissented in Robinson, took as his
model the court review of administrative procedures, wherein the court determines whether
an administrative agency has lawfully promulgated rules and then has followed its own
rules. Id. at 1112-23.
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out without constitutionally adequate cause. The Supreme Court had
held, in Terry v. Ohio, 139 that "[tihe scope of the search must be 'strictly
tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." ' n Terry required that the court's inquiry in Robinson
necessarily be "a dual one-whether the officer's action was justified at
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the cir14 1 Ofcumstances which justified the interference in the first place."'
ficer Jenks' search would "comply with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment only if its scope [was] no broader than necessary to accomplish legitimate governmental objectives.""14
Judge Wright viewed these Fourth Amendment limitations on the
scope of search as "essentially 'functional' in nature." 4 ' He found it
necessary "to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen,""' and thus to consider what are the "legitimate
objectives of an arrest based search."14' 5 Using this approach, he agreed
with the Supreme Court in Preston v. United States'4 6 which found the
rule allowing contemporaneous searches to be justified, "for example,
by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to
assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent
the destruction of evidence of the crime.""'
Considering Officer Jenks' search as a "search for weapons. . . [it]
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation." '4 8 Judge Wright reasoned that any intrusion on Robinson's privacy "should be permitted only if necessary to
achieve substantial governmental interests," 41 9 such as protection of the
officer.
Judge Wright therefore inquired whether Officer Jenks had sufficient constitutional cause to conduct a search. The Government had
argued that there is an unqualified right to search incident to all "routine" traffic arrests. 50 But Judge Wright adopted the reasoning of
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19-20.
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1091.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1093.
376 U.S. 364 (1964).
Id. at 367.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25-26.
471 F.2d at 1099.
Id. at 1096.
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Terry, that only when there exists special facts or circumstances, which
give rise to reasonable suspicion on the officer's part that the person
with whom he is dealing is armed and presently dangerous, may there
be even a limited pat-down for weapons. 15 1 In routine traffic stops
there is no basis for such a frisk. The reasoning behind this conclusion
is straightforward, as Judge Wright noted that the vast majority of trafare law-abiding citizens with little propensity for viofic violators
52
lence.1
The government raised an argument of the sort discussed in section V as a "crime problem argument"1 5 3 -that the number of police
killed in the course of making traffic arrests justifies an interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment approving a standard police policy of
searches.' 54 Judge Wright noted the statistics that in the year 1970-71,
six police officers died and ninety-two others were injured in the course
of making traffic arrests. Judge Wright realized, however, that figures
of this type must be placed in "proper perspective," an approach utilized in section V, below. He compared the figure to the "millions of
traffic arrests made annually," and, rejecting the crime problem argument, concluded that traffic arrests are "possibly the safest of all law
enforcement activities" and that the risk of injury to an officer is "re55
mote."'
d.

Balancing and the Scope of Search

Judge Wright then turned his attention from the routine traffic
stop to the in-custody arrest. He found the difference between the two
not to be "'the greater likelihood that a person taken into custody is
armed, but rather the increased likelihood of danger to the officer if in
fact the person is armed.' "156 Judge Wright concluded that this difference would justify officers' conducting afrisk in every in-custody arrest, even absent grounds for suspicion of danger in the individual case,
151. Id. at 1097.
152. Id. at 1096. Accord, People v. Superior Court (Kiefer), 3 Cal. 3d 807, 829, 478 P.2d
449, 464, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 744 (1970); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 101, 281 N.Y.S.2d
789, 792, 228 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1967) (Fuld, C.J.).
153. The prosecution argument considered here is a strong version of the crime problem
argument discussed in section V infra. The argument here is that the incidence of the particular dangerous activity is sufficiently great that the government's conclusion on the Fourth
Amendment issue of probable cause should be accepted.

154. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, ANNUAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CASUALTY SUMMARY 11 (July 1970-June 1971).
155. 471 F.2d at 1097.
156. Id. at 1098 (quoting People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal. 3d 186, 214, 496 P.2d
1205, 1225, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 857 (1972) (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original)).
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because the dangers to police officers in custodial arrest situations are
sharply accentuated by the
prolonged proximity of the accused to po15 7
lice following the arrest.
Judge Wright grounded this conclusion on the premise that there
is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balanc'5
ing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."' 1
He believed this to involve the striking of a "reasonable balance under
the Fourth Amendment," permitting intrusion upon the individual's
privacy where "necessary to achieve substantial governmental interests."' 159 Weighing the frisk, with its substantial intrusion upon the individual, 6 0 against the substantial protection afforded the officer,
Judge Wright concluded that the danger justified the intrusion on pri61
vacy. 1
e.

The "Lesser Included Intrusion" Theory

Judge Wright's reasoning rejects what might be called the "lesser
included intrusion" theory as justification of such searches. In Robinson, the government had argued that it had the right to do an "inventory search" of an offender prior to confining him in jail,162 and since
the suspect would be searched before jailing anyway, "a search of this
kind might 'just as well' be conducted in the field at the time of arrest."' 63 Subjecting the defendant to a "full search" (ie., reaching into
pockets) at a different time and place than at his jailing would, under
this argument, constitute no additional intrusion on his right of privacy,
and would thus be justified. Judge Wright rejected this conclusion. It
was not clear to him that Robinson would have had to be searched at
the jail; perhaps all that may legitimately be required upon jailing of a
suspect is that he be given the opportunity to "check" his belongings in
a sealed envelope."
157. Id. He would also allow a full search where the frisk "causes the officer's suspicions
to be reasonably aroused as to weapons." Id.
158. 471 F.2d at 1099 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967)).
159. 471 F.2d at 1099.
160. Id.
161. Terry ruled the protection substantial, 392 U.S. at 29, and the evidence in the Robinson remand hearing so indicated. 471 F.2d at 1100-01.
162. 471 F.2d at 1101.
163. Id. at 1082.
164. Judge Wright raises this question in a footnote, without deciding it. 471 F.2d at
1101 n.32. See also United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231, 1239 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
bane). There is another possible justification for the police search, not overtly argued by the
Government, which Judge Wright's analysis has rejected. The police may wish to search for
evidence of other crimes; for example, the officer may wish to use the traffic violation arrest
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Judge Wright did not regard the mere existence of probable cause
to arrest for one crime as supplying probable cause to search the suspect for evidence of other crimes; there is no probable cause to believe
that one who has broken one law will have about him evidence of another crime. Thus, the traffic arrest did not justify Officer Jenks' search
of a "container," the cigarette package, which might contain illegal
contraband. The search would only have been justified had Officer
Jenks had probable cause, growing out of the facts of the case, to believe that 65Robinson's cigarette package in fact contained contraband
1
material.
Judge Wright similarly did not reason that an arrest ipsofacto legalizes a search of the arrestee's person, even for material related to the
very crime for which he was arrested. Though the Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Maroney166 said that "the circumstances justifying the arrest are also those furnishing probable cause for the search," 167 the justification lies not in the arrest itself, but rather in the fact that "for most
crimes it is clearly reasonable to assume that the arrestee will be in
possession of the fruits, instrumentalities or other evidence of the crime
for which the person is arrested" which usually justifies a search incident to arrest. 16 8 Judge Wright thus observed that there exists some
crimes for which "no search of the person for evidence may be allowed
at all because no evidence exists to be found." 16 9 In Robinson, the officer had observed the suspect driving and had known his operator's
permit to be invalid; there were no other instrumentalities or evidence
of the crime which the officer could possibly have believed to be in
Robinson's possession, and Robinson's crimes had no "fruit" for which
7
to search.' 1
Judge Wright concluded from these facts that the technical arrest
as an excuse for a narcotics search. If so, Judge Wright concludes, the case would fall under
the "pretext" doctrine and the search would clearly be illegal. 471 F.2d at 1088 n.3. See
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
Robinson argued in the court of appeals that his arrest on a traffic violation was a
pretext to make a narcotics search. The officer denied that motive, and Judge Wright, for
the purposes of his analysis, accepted the officer's testimony, since he found the search unconstitutional on other grounds.
165. 471 F.2d at 1090 n.9.
166. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
167. Id. at 47 n.6. For example, probable cause to arrest for drunken driving will usually
consist of facts which also constitute probable cause to believe that alcohol will be discovered by a search of the arrestee's bloodstream, as in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
168. 471 F.2d at 1094.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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for the traffic violation gave the officer no grounds to search, absent
Terry cause to frisk for weapons based on specific articulable facts. A
full search of Robinson's person incident to his arrest would only have
been justified had there been reason to believe that weapons or evidence were present; in a custody traffic arrest this would clearly not be
the case. Though the potential danger from the extended presence of
the arrested person in his custody justified Officer Jenks' frisk for weapons, he exceeded the permissible limits of a frisk when he extracted
from Robinson's pocket a cigarette package which was clearly not a
weapon, and searched it.
Judge Wright recognized that when a court deals with criminal

conduct and there is a strong showing of guilt, "there is a natural aversion to reversing a conviction on procedural grounds."' 7' He rejected
that natural aversion as a guide to decision, however, choosing instead
to vindicate the right of every individual to be free from the interference of others, 172 and to vindicate society's interest in "the integrity of
our criminal process."

E.

173

Conclusion

A number of principles seem exemplified in the sample of Judge
Wright's criminal procedure cases reviewed here. As a prerequisite to

affirmance of conviction and punishment, several factors must concur.
171. Id. at 1108.
172. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
173. 471 F.2d at 1108. After the court of appeals' decision in Robinson, the Solicitor
General successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Justice Rehnquist wrote
for the Court reversing Judge Wright's decision and authorizing a full search in all custodial
arrests, even for traffic offenses. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Justice Rehnquist held that the Court's decision was justified by a "long line of authority." While based upon the "need to disarm" and to discover evidence, the decision did not
depend upon "the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect." Id, at 233-35. Thus not only did
Justice Rehnquist find that no warrant was required for the Robinson search, but further,
that neither probable cause to search nor reasonable suspicion justifying the search were
required. Rehnquist declared that the "fact of the lawful arrest" by itself "establishes the
authority to search." Id. at 235.
This rationale is made explicit in Justice Powell's concurring opinion, where he wrote
that it is the custodial arrest, not the search, which is "the significant intrustion of state
power into the privacy of [the] person." Id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring). Consequently,
the individual "retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest." Id. This rationale
seems to be the "lesser included intrusion" doctrine, mentioned above.
Justice Rehnquist seemed also to make a version of the crime problem argument by
referring to "statistical data concerning assaults on police officers who are in the course of
making arrests." Id. at 234 n.5.

Summer 1980]
Summer 19801

GREAT EXECUTIVE HAND

GREAT EXECUTIVE HAND

Some of them look backwards to rights, rules and morality, and others
look forward to consequences.
The guilty should be punished, and only the guilty. Affirmance
should be based on a factually accurate account as to what happened at
trial and during the offense; no unnecessary factual presumptions on
ambiguous data should be indulged against the accused. The jury has
a proper role in passing moral judgment on the accused and his act;
acquittal is in order if they deem him either legally or morally innocent. The police, prosecutor and court must observe the accused's constitutional rights. The government may morally condemn the accused
only if it has acted morally toward him in the transaction between
them.
The court may properly consider the effect of its decision on the
immediate parties; an affirmance of conviction is no abstract philosophical judgment, but may result in long imprisonment. The court
may also properly consider the effect of its decisions on others, that is,
both deterrence of criminality and deterrence of police abuse. The
court has a responsibility to reconsider old principles of law, and has a
variety of bases of legal authority by which to develop the law.
II.

Lessons for a Law Clerk

When Judge Wright decided some of the cases just mentioned, I
was serving as his law clerk. In honor of Judge Wright's 30 years as a
federal judge, perhaps I can be excused for reminiscing about what I
learned from him.
During my fourteen months with Judge Wright, I received training
through apprenticeship-the legal equivalent of a medical residency.
Judge Wright was a professional model for me, but what stands out in
my memory is a pastiche of personal moments: being given a lift in his
old car, joining the judge in visiting his friends in New Orleans, having
dinner with Judge and Mrs. Wright or talking to their son about sports
cars. I remember the evening Justice and Mrs. Black were invited over
to dinner in honor of his birthday; Mrs. Wright had arranged a birthday cake reading "One man, one vote." One lunch hour I asked for a
little extra time to attend a meeting down the street at the Lincoln Memorial. Judge Wright went too, and took along Judge Bazelon, and the
two of them were probably the highest ranking officials of the government to be at Martin Luther King's famous speech, "I have a

932

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:907

dream." 174
That was also the year President Kennedy was shot in Dallas. The
court was called at once into en bane session so it could adjourn in his
honor. The next day the White House was ringed with Secret Service
men carrying long guns as we all wondered what the shooting meant to
the nation. Judge Wright, initially selected for elevation to the appellate bench by Robert Kennedy, might have been chosen Chief Justice,
had not the second assassination of a Kennedy a few years later
changed the probable results of that election and led to the selection of
a different young District of Columbia Circuit judge and a different
kind of Supreme Court.
A.

Cases Remembered

In the previous section I reviewed some of Judge Wright's opinions. Here I add two or three memories of specific cases.
Judge Wright, rather than take a a vacation, would often accept a
designation1 75 and go off to work just as hard for another court. During the year I clerked for him he sat by designation on the Fifth Circuit 1 76 bench in New Orleans for two weeks. Once during the Fifth
Circuit work Judge Wright asked me if, in a certain case, I thought he
should give up his dissent and go along with the majority, just to avoid
ill-feelings. When I answered that I thought not, Judge Wright agreed
and said he had just been testing me; Judge Wright's decisons once
made, were not to be changed merely because of opposition to them.
During the hot summer of that year the District of Columbia Circuit Judges noted that many defendants were being held in jail awaiting trial while district judges took vacations. Chief Judge Bazelon
designated two circuit judges to the district court to hold criminal trials
for defendants who had not made bail. Judges Wright and Burger, the
two most recently appointed judges, were chosen. As trial judge, Judge
Wright obediently followed appellate court precedents which, I believed, he would surely have voted to overrule had he been sitting in
the appellate court. But one case was different. Two police officers,
witnesses in a criminal case, had given testimony that smelled of perjury, but which barely avoided internal contradiction. The officers had
174. See King, I Have a Dream, in BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (A. Meier, E. Rudwick & F. Broderick eds. 1971).

175. Title 28 of the United States Code provides for the temporary designation and assignment of any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another circuit upon a showing of
need. 28 U.S.C. § 291 (1968).
176. See, e.g., Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964) (Wright, J.)
(right of out-of-state attorney to appear as counsel).
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even been mentioned by name in a previous appellate opinion, noting
the unlikelihood of the testimony they had given in another case. The
jury returned a guilty verdict. Before sentencing, however, the officers
were arrested on charges of bribery in a third, unrelated case; consequently, the defendant moved to set aside the verdict. The prosecutor
argued that, under the existing case law, even a conviction of the police
witnesses on the unrelated charge would not justify setting aside the
conviction based on their testimony. Judge Wright countered with the
reply that, be that as it may, he could make some new law.
A dramatic example of the responsibility of decision was the case
later reported as Application of the President and Directors of GeEdward Bennett Williams, as attorney for
orgetown College, Inc.'
Georgetown University Hospital, appeared in chambers one afternoon
with an application for Judge Wright, the only judge available from the
sitting motions panel. A young mother who was a Jehovah's Witness
had refused the blood transfusions necessary for a harmless operation,
without which she would soon die. The doctors of the hospital sought
permission to give the transfusions, so that they could operate. Judge
Wright drove to the hospital with me and Williams, held a brief hearing, and granted the application.
Judge Wright wrote a memorandum opinion promptly and when,
months later, a petition for rehearing en banc was filed, he filed a full
opinion. Several judges voting on the petition criticized his action; Circuit Judge Burger, for example, voted to dismiss for want of a justiciable controversy. 178 Burger suggested, not that the petition was moot,
filed as it was long after the operation was completed, but that Judge
Wright had acted outside the judicial power. He quoted Cardozo, saying that a judge "'is not a knight-errant, roaming at will'" and that he
"'is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence.' "179 The decision on the justiciability of the case, Judge
Burger said, must be made without regard to its probable effect, the
death of the woman in question.'1 0 Judge Wright's approach had been
quite different. He had the responsibility to make a decision when
there was no time for research, and only a few minutes for choice. He
177. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rehearingdenied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978
(1964).
178. 331 F.2d at 1015 (Burger, J.) (separate opinion).
179. Id.at 1017.
180. Id.at 1015.
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81
decided that where there is doubt, a judge must rule in favor of life.1

B.

The Process of Decision

How judges do and should decide cases are topics of such importance for lawyers and for the law that it may be of value for me to
record my observations in Judge Wright's chambers.
The basic rule of his chambers was that everything that went out
must be letter-perfect in law. Research was to be meticulous, al relevant precedents read, and every argument raised in the briefs dealt
with. Moreover, the transcripts were to be checked to make sure counsel had not missed a relevant issue. The court sat not only to rule on
the arguments of counsel, but to declare the law on the issues raised in
the case.
Two sets of all briefs arrived in the chambers; Judge Wright would
take one set home to review and the other he would give to me. (Circuit judges in those days had a single law clerk.) My first day in his
chambers I was given briefs dealing with a subject I had never takencriminal procedure-and told to be ready to discuss them first thing the
next day. In the morning, just before oral argument on the case, Judge
Wright engaged me in a type of dialogue which left me bewildered
until I learned the rules. Judge Wright would explain a case to me,
lecture if you will, and I was to interrupt, argue back, question, and
criticize. Or I could, if I wanted, explain the case to him, and he would
cross-examine me.
At the close of our first such dialogue, the judge asked me how I
thought the case should be decided. I was dumbfounded. I thought I
had given good arguments, pro and con, on both sides of the case.
Nothing more had ever been expected of me in law school classes and
exams. The reality that an actual case had to be decided, one way or
the other, came as an emotional jolt after three years of Socratic dialogue.
The District of Columbia Circuit did not have a policy of assigning a particular judge to prepare in advance a bench memo or draft
opinion on cases receiving plenary argument. 182 Each day the court
sat, three judges chosen by lot would sit as the panel, and immediately
183
after oral argument they would hold conference and cast their votes.
181. Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at
1000.
182. See generally R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1974).
183. Motions were different. Each week a motions panel of three judges was chosen by
lot, different from the panel which sat each day to hear arguments on appeals. Motions
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Judge Wright would return to chambers from conference and announce how the cases had been decided and whether he was writing for
the majority, dissent, or concurrence. He would assign some of his
opinions to himself to write and assign me to prepare a first draft on
others. I was encouraged to suggest amendments or edit his opinions.
When I submitted a draft the judge did not find to his liking he would
not edit, but would instead rewrite the opinion from scratch.
Beginning law students may think that judges have no discretion
and merely "follow the law." A few months into their first year, students may think that judges do "anything they want." The truth, of
course, is that neither belief is correct. 1 84 Context gives some clue to
the more complicated reality: the procedural posture frames the issues
for the judge. A circuit judge, moreover, must convince his colleagues
if his view is to prevail. 185 Most important, and at the core of the hard
task of judging, is the struggle to determine which is the proper result.
The weight of decision can be heavy.
In his court of appeals decisions, Judge Wright was faithful both to
Supreme Court precedent and, under local practice, the decisions of the
other three-judge panels of the circuit; jury decisions on credibility,
though contrary to the judge's own reading of the testimony, were also
inviolate. Similarly, on motions to rehear en bane a decision of a panel,
the judge did not believe a vote to grant en bane rehearing was justified
merely because he would have voted differently had he been on the
panel. 8 6 Within those procedural and precedential constraints, however, Judge Wright seemed to strive to do justice and to help develop
just law.
Though the idea that judges can function like phonographs, automatically producing the appropriate legal noises once the correct record is inserted, now has been widely repudiated, there is much criticism
work was generally staffed, not by the judges' law clerksr but by two motions clerks, who
were attached to the clerks' office and served longer than a year.
184. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
185. The decisionmaking on appeal is best conceived of, not as made in conference, but
as made individually by each judge. This is true because the judge assigned to write the
majority opinion circulates his opinion to the whole panel; as does the dissenter, if any; and
the third judge on the panel is also free to circulate a concurrence. Each judge is then free to
join any opinion which convinces him. Thus, the third judge could join the opinion which
has been written as the dissent, making it the majority opinion. Or even the judge issigned
to write the majority might be convinced by the dissenting opinion rather than by his own
research, and switch his vote.
186. The court en banc does not function as a general court of appeals from the panel.
Stephens, Shop Talk Concerningthe Businessofthe Court,20 J.D.C.B. ASS'N 103, 109 (1953).
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of judges functioning by "hunch," or "judgment intuitive."' 7 Judge
Wright's approach to deciding a case avoids both these extremes. First,
he carefully studies the facts of the case and the legal arguments. Then,
making use of his vast knowledge of the caselaw and his wide judicial
experience, he makes a decision that is a choice, albeit tentative. Next,
an opinion is drafted, whether his opinion or one by another member
of the panel. The opinion must respond to each argument raised by
counsel and to each point raised by another judge. It must deal with
issues, even if not raised by counsel, which are apparent in the record,
and must consider precedents on point even if not called to the court's
attention by counsel. The decision must be meticulously logical. It
sometimes happens that the discipline of committing the opinion to
writing demonstrates that the tentative decision is not justified under
existing precedents. The judge must then rethink his decision, generally to bring it into line with the precedents. But sometimes, the equity
of the tentative judgment is sufficiently strong that the judge will conclude that precedent must be overruled; or, if the case is governed by a
Supreme Court precedent or the decision of another panel, the judge
may record respectful disagreement. Of course a vote to change the
law is justified only when the anticipated effect of such a precedent is
considered and approved.
This painstaking process precludes the "judgment intuitive," yet
allows for a break with precedent when it fails to deal justly with cases
such as the one at bar. Thus, Judge Wright's opinions seems to satisfy
both the criteria of meticulous legal reasoning and of justice.
C.

Conclusion

J. Skelly Wright has, for seventeen years, been a judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
He is immune to a common criticism leveled at appellate judges-that
of inexperience. He has been both prosecutor and trial judge, coming
to the court of appeals from prior service as United States Attorney,
and as United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana. As district judge, Wright had achieved nationwide acclaim for his
courage in enforcing the constitutional right of the school children of
New Orleans to desegregated schools. 8 8 New Orleans schools were, as
187. See Hutcheson, Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "'Hunch"in JudicialDecisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); Hutcheson, Epilogue, 71 YALE L.J. 277 (1961).
188. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956), affd,242 F.2d
156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957). (Judge Wright's order to integrate the New
Orleans school system was the first major implementation of Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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a result, the first in the nation to be desegregated. Impressed by Judge
Robert Kennedy decided
Wright's principled stand, Attorney General
89
to nominate him to the appellate bench.1
Judge Wright's work as an appellate judge has revealed professional skill in identifying the procedural framework which defines what
can be done, detailed knowledge of the facts, extensive research and
use of precedents, care in logic, and flair with language. His opinions
have exhibited judicial statesmanship, attention to the broad issues
raised in each case and the effect of his decisions on the growth of the
law, compassion for the individual lives affected, willingness to make a
decision and then to hold fast to it against pressure or threats, and utter
honesty in word and deed. In Judge Wright's work, professional skill
and judicial statesmanship are intertwined.
Judge Wright's work is free of the criticism to which the opinions
of some of the greatest jurists have been subjected, that they were not
well crafted, technically deficient, sloppy, not scholarly--or that they
were merely result-oriented. 90 Judge Wright's opinions are worthy of
the same praise that Augustus Hand extended to Louis Brandeis on the
latter's seventy-fifth birthday. Hand said he was "particularly impressed by the care with which you justify and fortify your conclusions
in all the opinions you reach .. ."191 One may also properly apply to
Judge Wright the words used by President Carter about Justice Douglas, at the close of the Justice's 36 years of service on the bench. Judge
Wright, like Justice Douglas, is worthy of being hailed "a lion-like defender of individual liberty. . . fiercely certain that the simple words
of the Bill of Rights were meant19to2 protect the humblest citizen from
any exercise of arbitrary power."
J. Skelly Wright has been termed by an eminent constitutional his189. Newspapers reported that the possibility of Judge Wright's nomination to the Fifth
Circuit was forestalled by the opposition of a local senator: Halberstam, Judge Ls Opposedby
SenatorLong, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1961, at 22, col. 3. I was one of many who were indignant that a judge would be punished in this way for doing his constitutional duty. Dershowitz & Levine, Pressureson Judges,Christian Sci. Monitor, June 15, 1961 (Editorial), at 12,
col. 4.
190. See Countryman, Scholarship and Common Sense, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1407, 1409
(1980).
191. Speech by A. Hand, in honor of Louis Brandeis' 75th birthday quotedin A. BICKEL,
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 34 (1967). It can be said of Judge
Wright, as Abraham Goldstein said of his colleague, that he is "a judge who could satisfy
the best sense ofjudicial craftsmanship while at the same time not taking old assumptions or
doctrines too much for granted." Goldstein, On DavidBazelon r 25th Year as a Judge, 123
U. PA. L. Rnv. 254, 254 (1974).
192. L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
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torian "one of our finest federal judges."' 193 He has a rightful place as
the first James Madison lecturer on the Bill of Rights outside the
Supreme Court.' 9 4
A society depends upon its legal system-courts, lawyers, law
schools, the laws themselves-to help achieve justice, or at least, within
human frailty and through law, to seek it. "Justice, and only justice,
you shall follow," is the ancient requirement. 195 When a person devotes his career to work in the law, in reviewing his contribution, one
may ask whether through his craftsmanship and wisdom, he has done
more than another might have done in his place, toward the pursuit of
justice. By this standard, Judge Wright's career on the bench stands as
a lesson for those who come after.
III.

Two Models of the Criminal Process?

It is common for observers to think of the District of Columbia
Circuit as comprised of two groups: the so-called "liberals" and "conservatives." This section discusses that dichotomy among types of
judges in the criminal justice process. It seeks to describe Judge Wright
within the context of the different approaches to decisionmaking judges
take in criminal procedure cases.
A.

"Law and Order"

One difference among judges in criminal cases concerns the values
they recognize as relevant. Some give the Fourth Amendment, in the
words of Justice Frankfurter, "a place second to none in the Bill of
Rights," while others "consider it on the whole a kind of nuisance, a
19 6
serious impediment in the war against crime."'
There is a dichotomy in the debates on criminal procedure between those calling for "law and order" and those who fear law enforcement excesses. 197 The former group believes that crime in the
193. L. LEVY, JUDGEMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 54
(1972).
194. See Wright, Public School Segregatiorn Legal Remediesfor De Facto Segregation,
40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 285 (1963).
195. Deuteronomy 16:20 (Revised Standard Version).
196. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "The
overriding constitutional issue of our time has been the split between those who view the Bill
of Rights as a firm judicial mandate empowering the Supreme Court" to enforce its specific
prohibitions, and those who merely balance its values against competing ones. Redlich, Are
There "Certain Rights. . . Retainedby the People?" 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962).
197. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964). See also
H. PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
In a contemporary scholarship, the locus classicus of the dichotomy is Herbert Packer's
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streets is a major American social problem. They particularly stress the
problem of mugging-robbery by means of physical force or through
threats at knife-point. 19 8 They believe that statistics demonstrate that
the crime problem worsens yearly, 199 and claim that undisciplined
members of minority groups are the major culprits.2 °00 They lament
that the white middle-class, particularly the elderly, are the major victims. 20 ' They believe that prison sentences are now too light, and that
the crime problem could be ameliorated if judges would give longer
prison sentences to the criminals once caught. 20 2 Harsh punishments,

they claim, are not only effective, but are also just, and imprisonment,
in particular, is a just and effective punishment. They find judges un-

duly disposed to exonerate defendants, 2 3 even where doing so violates

discussion in Two Models of the CriminalProcess,contrasting what he called the "Crime
Control Model" with the "Due Process Model." The Crime Control Model, as formulated
by Packer, emphasizes the social importance of the crime problem, and therefore adopts the
repression of criminal conduct as the key function of the criminal process. It adopts the
method of "efficiency," meaning a mass-production process suited to quantity output, and
therefore relies upon police and prosecutors to operate the system in an informal administrative style, based on legislative authority. The Due Process Model, as Packer defines it, by
contrast often involves a skepticism about the morality and utility of the bases of the criminal law. It recognizes competing functions such as the prevention of official oppression of
the individual, and achievement of equality. It accepts a method emphasizing reliability and
quality control and therefore relies on formal, adversarial, adjudicative fact-finding under
the superintendence of the judiciary, based ultimately upon constitutional authority.
198. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRES.
CRIME COMM'N].

199. See Republican Platform 1972; Republican Platform 1968; American Independent
Platform 1968; and Democratic Platform 1960, all reprinted in D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL
PARTY PLATFORMS (1978). See also note 3 supra. However, the President's Crime Commission was unable to determine whether the incidence of crime is more or less, compared to
five, ten, or twenty-five years ago, among persons of the same age, sex, race and place of
residence. See PRES. CRIME COMM'N, supra note 198, at 31.
200. There are strong arguments, however, that our society's treatment of the poor and
minorities renders punishment of them unjust. See, e.g., Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal
Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); but see Morse, Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply
to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976).
201. Young people are the age group with the highest victimization rates; elderly people,
in general, have the lowest victimization rates. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION & STATISTICAL SERVICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1975,
at 20, tables 4 & 5 (1976).
202. There is some evidence to support the conclusion that it makes no appreciable difference on a later conviction whether a court hands out imprisonment or probation, however. See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 18 (1970).
203. Though this belief is prevalent, "the ACLU points out that the United States, with
the exception of Russia and South Africa, puts more people in prison than any other industrialized nation. . . ." Kerby, OvercrowdedPenalSystem a Prisonerof Society, L.A. Times,
June 5, 1980, § 2, at 1, col. 4.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:907

the rule of "strict construction" 2" and infringes upon the prerogatives
of an elected legislature in a democracy. They perceive judicial activism as increasing the crime rate.
B.

Concern with Repression and Police Abuse

Some view the police with suspicion. One writer has argued that
the police are not an "appendage of the law" but rather an "extension
of the violent potential of the state";2" 5 another believes that "the police
for the distribution of situationally
are nothing else than a mechanism
' 20 6
justified force in society."
Criticism of the police seems to be more common among minorities. A survey of attitudes in nineteen cities and four suburbs was taken
following the widespread rioting in the 1960's.217 In almost all localities, blacks voiced the same grievances-"police practices" were first on
the list, with specific complaints of verbal or physical abuse of black
citizens by police officers.2 °8
In addition to complaints of such police abuse, some have voiced
fear that law enforcement has been used by the government as an instrument for repression. Justice Frankfurter once quoted the words of
Chief Justice Hughes, on the subject of the Mitchell-Palmer raids of
1919-1920:209 "We cannot afford to ignore the indications that, perhaps
to an extent unparalleled in our history, the essentials of liberty are
of personal rights which savor of
being disregarded. . .[by] violations
2 10
tyranny.
of
practices
the worst
In the last half century, when the "dark image" of totalitarian dictatorships has loomed large in our consciousness, that spectre has
served as the contrast by which some have defined the American polity.
Thus some have been especially conscious of any tendencies toward
police state tactics within our own political self, and have striven to
fashion a national identity which is the opposite of that despised vi204. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 55. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S.
563 (1977) (rule of lenity).
205.

P. MANNING, POLICE WORK: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING

40 (1977).
206. E. BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 39 (1970).
207.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 15 (1968).

208. Id. at 44 (supplemental studies).
209. "Recollection may be refreshed as to the happenings after the first World War by
the 'Report upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice,' which
aroused the public concern of Chief Justice Hughes (then at the bar)." Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 173 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
210. Id. at 173 n.8 (quoting Address by Hughes, Harvard Law School Centennial (June
21, 1920) (entitled Some Observations on Legal Education and DemocraticProgress)).
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sion.2 1I
In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases reversing a state court
conviction-one based on a confession obtained through torture-Justice Black used words like "dictatorially" and "tyranny," and contrasted "some government's" approach to crime with "our
constitutional system," where "courts stand against any winds that
blow as havens of refuge
for those who might otherwise suffer because
2 12
they are helpless.
While our nation's police forces are admired by many for their

apolitical professionalism, nevertheless fears of repression in America
have been aroused by such incidents as the confinement of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II, the excesses of the
McCarthy era, the COINTELPRO program of the FBI, the plans to
detain persons without criminal charges in cases of emergencies, and
the government surveillance of domestic "enemies" via wiretaps, mail
2 13
openings, break-ins and intrusions.
211. Such imagery can be traced through a line of Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g.,
Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 199 n.16 (1979); Hudson v. United States, 402 U.S. 965,
966 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 67
(1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773 (1946); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 499 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting).
212. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
213. A. THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER
TO THE HUSTON PLAN (1978). Ten congressional reports and hearings on the subject are
cited id. at 245-46, and a more complete list of primary sources is given id. at 307-10. See
also SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H. REP. No. 931305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Seegeneraly N. BLACKSTOCK, COINTELPRO: THE FBI's
SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL FREEDOM (1976); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 53-55 (1969); J. ELLIFF, FBI AND DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE (R. Blum ed. 1973);
GRIFFITH, POLITICS OF FEAR 131-51 (1970); M. HALPERIN, J. BORMAN, R. BOROSAGE & C.
MARWICK, THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
(1976); P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-16 (1978); E. LATHAM, THE
COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON 319-416 (1966); M. LEVIN, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION (1971); P. MURPHY, THE
MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 67-100 (1972); C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 207-87 (1948); M. WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS
(1976); WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 50-70 (1975); Bernstein, The

Roadlo WatergateandBeyond." The Growth and,4buse ofExecutive Authority Since 1940,40
58 (1976); Oakes, The ProperRole of the FederalCourts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 911, 925 (1979); Rostow, The Japanese-American
Cases-4Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945), reprintedin E. RosToW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 193 (1962).
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
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Concern over such practices have led some to counsel against any
crusade of single-minded crime fighting efforts.2 14 "It is vital, no doubt,
that criminals be detected, and that all relevant evidence should be secured and used. . . . [But nothing] less is involved than that which
makes for an atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and
repression for society as a whole," wrote Frankfurter.21 - Judge Wright
has quoted the words of Justice Jackson, who said that:
[the Fourth Amendment] rights, I protest, are not mere secondclass rights but belong to the catalog of indispensable freedoms.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the
first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. 1 6
Judge Wright noted that Justice Jackson wrote these words "[s]hortly
after his return from the Nuremburg trials,"21 7 with the lessons of Nazi
criminal procedure fresh in mind.
C.

The "Eightfold Way" and Beyond

The dichotomy just set out is similar to Herbert Packer's description of one spectrum of conceptions of the criminal process-a spectrum spanning two alternative "models."2 8 But there are at least three
other dimensions of the judicial decisionmaking process, each encompassing its own inherent dichotomy. Using these differentiations,
judges may be placed on any of four spectra, each reflecting a range of
judicial views between two extremes on how to best administer criminal justice. One might be tempted to analogize to the physicists' categorization of subatomic particles as the "Eightfold Way. '2 9 But the
dichotomization of judicial types, like that of nuclear particles, seems
to multiply as the subject is more closely examined.2 c
214. See, e.g., Oakes, supra note 213.
215. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 73 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
216. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 628 n.86 (1975) (en banc) (Wright, J.) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) (also quoted approvingly in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 413 U.S. 266, 274
(1973)).
217. 516 F.2d at 628 n.86.
218. See PACKER, supra note 197, at 1.
219. The phrase "eightfold way," referring to triple symmetries involving eight types of
items, was popularized by physicists Murray Gell-Mann and Yuval Ne'eman. See, e.g., H.
LIPKIN, LIE GROUPS FOR PEDESTRIANS (1965). The term was borrowed from the East. See
also E. THOMAS, HISTORY OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT (2d. ed. 1951).
220. Many recent characterizations of the Burger Court criminal procedure cases provide
an example of this. Some writers have emphasized that the accurate determination of guilt,
and the control of crime, are very different goals; the former is said to represent the ideology
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This section, therefore, presents only a tentative exploration of
normative theories of the criminal justice process, and is intended to
help distinguish the roots of Judge Wright's opinions from those of
judges who differ with him. What is clear is that the differing judicial
orientations do not merely range along a single spectrum.
It may be useful to imagine these criminal justice orientations as
occupying four different spectra. The first is of criminal justice values
the judge recognized in criminal cases. At one end of the spectrum, the
only value recognizes as relevant is crime control, or reducing the incidence of unlawful behavior.2z2 At the opposite pole, the only value
recognized is that of liberty from government abuse. The former perspective identifies crime control as the purpose of the criminal law.
Adherents to the latter perspective argue that achievement of such a
goal would not require a criminal law, just police, and that the purpose
of superimposing courts and law on the crime fighting forces is to restrain them.2 22 Between the two "pure" positions are many intermediate positions which recognize that the substantive law of crimes
encompasses both goals, and that additional values are manifested in
the rules of criminal procedure, evidence law, and the Bill of Rights.
A second continuum upon which to differentiate judges in criminal cases involves the basis for decision making. At one pole, the consequences of a decision are thought to justify a decision. At the other
pole, decisions are thought to be based on preexisting rights or rules.
Crime control is a consequentialist value; the corresponding non-consequentialist value is probably guilt determination.2 2 3 Liberty is similarly
of the Burger Court, while the latter represents its reality. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: .4n Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 436 (1980). Equality is also said to be the Warren Court's primary value in criminal
justice decisions, though other writers discern an opposite tendency which they for some
reason frequently label libertarian. The Court's law and order position has been said to
represent not a single goal but contrasting ones. Rumbaut & Bittner, Changing Conceptions
ofthe Police Role: A Sociological Re iew, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 239, 251 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1979). The control of crime often has been
contrasted with the protection of liberty and the control of governmental excess. Still other
tendencies, too numerous to record, have been recognized in the Court's opinions.
221. But even the substantive law of crimes incorporates values other than crime control.
See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1960); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW (1961); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Offi-

cial Draft 1961).
222. Criminal law serves the function of restraining government by leaving unprohibited
most activities, by restricting the police in their interventions, and by limiting long-term
assumption of state control to those people who have violated a law as determined in the
prescribed manner.
223. See Seidman, supra note 220, at 483-501.
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a consequentialist goal;224 the corresponding non-consequentialist
value could be termed "obedience to law," that is, obedience to that
which is understood to be commanded by the Bill of Rights and like
2 25

rules.

A third manner of differentiating judges is based upon their conception of the role of judges vis-a-vis other government officials. At
one end of the spectrum is the activist position, which advocates formulation of decisions autonomously from other officials. At the opposite
pole are judges dedicated to judicial restraint and deference to the decisions of other institutions. Crime control may be seen as an activist as
well as a consequentialist position;22 6 guilt determination may be seen
as a nonactivist as well as a non-consequentialist position. Similarly,
the liberty perspective is activist as well as consequentialist; obedience
to law seems to be conversely nonactivist and non-consequentialist.
Finally, a fourth manner of differentiating between judges involves the extent to which each is willing to consider values extrinsic to
the criminal justice process in deciding criminal cases.227
224. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655-57 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
225. "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)(Brandeis, I., dissenting).
226. An activist position accepting the value of fighting crime as pre-eminent, yet not
conceived in terms of consequences, is also possible; this is exemplified by the courts' role in
prosecuting crimes by analogy, as defined by some European codes.
227. The Warren Court was said to see the criminal trial as a morality play on which
conflicts between our most deeply felt values were played out. Seidman, supra note 220, at
442. See Fortas, Thurman Arnold andthe Theater of the Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988, 999-1001
(1970). While crime control is a perspective whose goals are no broader than the substantive
law of crimes, a broader perspective might lead a decisionmaker to seek to reduce the incidence of undesired behavior not limited to that prohibited by criminal law. Thus some
speak of the order maintenance function of police, others of using the criminal apparatus to
reduce social cost. An "economic" theory that the function of criminal law is the minimization of social cost is stated by R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF L aw 163 (2d ed. 1977);
see also Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). Still others analyze the criminal law process in terms of social conflict between those
who control government and those classes which are controlled.
While the liberty perspective is native or intrinsic to the criminal law, this would not be
true of a perspective seeking some broader value, such as equality--that is, making judicial
decisions so as to equalize the resource positions of rich and poor.
Corresponding to the crime control liberty perspective of the criminal law are goals
extrinsic to the law, such as condemnation. Criminal law serves goals of moral condemnation both by expressing its condemnation in general terms within the laws themselves, and in
specific terms with respect to particular acts and actors through trials. See Stephen, supra
note 185. Morris and Hawkins wrote that, "A more sophisticated critic might suggest that
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Defining "pure types," and differentiating among them, is a convenient analytical device. 228 However, judges, and even individual decisions, will most likely take positions somewhere in between the
extremes regarded as the pure positions. For example, a variant of the
guilt determination position, which is not as purely devoted to crime
fighting, is the position equally devoted to seeking accurate and neutral
determinations of innocence as of guilt. Such a position might be
termed individualized history. One variant of the judicial integrity position emphasizes the fairness of the criminal process. A consequentialist variant of the "obedience to law" perspective focusing on the Bill of
Rights seeks affirmatively to deter police illegalities. Employing a
broad definition of "law," this might be termed a "law enforcement"
position.
These examples are by no means exhaustive; they are offered only
to put in context the dichotomy next set out. There are many different
ideas as to which analytical dimensions it is useful to identify, how to
define them, and which positions along each spectrum should be recognized; it seems clear that Packer's "two models" impoverish one's range
of choices.
D.

Contrasting Views in the District of Columbia Circuit

This background may help one appreciate the complexity of the
"liberal" versus "conservative" dichotomy in criminal justice cases in
the District of Columbia Circuit. For example, in the first Killough v.
United States2 2 9 case discussed above, the majority excluded a confession which was the fruit of an illegal delay in bringing the accused
before the magistrate; newly-appointed Judge Wright would have simi• ..[c]riminal processes are. . . public morality plays. They have deterrent purposes, perhaps, but they certainly aim dramatically to affirm the minimum standards of conduct society will tolerate. By public ceremony and defined liturgy, criminal trials stigmatize those
who fail to conform to society's standards. In short, the criminal justice system is a namecalling, stigmatizing, community superego reinforcing system." N. MoRRIs & G. HAWKINS,
supra note 202, at 182.
Some form of natural law position should correspond to the intrinsic perspective of
obedience to law. Similarly, a broader perspective, seeking to affirm the autonomy and
dignity of the individual, should correspond to the intrinsic position of seeking judicial integrity. Another extrinsic perspective might, in the spirit of fraternity, seek to recognize the
defendant's dignity as a fellow human being. Rival extrinsic positions establish crimes by
analogy, whether by analogy to existing crimes or to the popular moral sense.
228. See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 294, 323 (H. Gerth & C. Mills
trans. 1958); see also MAX WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 98,
329 (A. Henderson & T. Parsons eds. 1947); Gerth & Mills, Introduction: The Man andHis
Work in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 3, 59-60.
229. 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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larly excluded testimony relating to the discovery of the corpse, also the
fruit of that period of illegal detention.
Commenting on Judge Wright's separate opinion, Circuit Judge
Burger accused Wright of erroneously assuming important facts and
confusing lines of cases; he regarded Judge Wright's230
opinion as carrying the suppression doctrine to "ridiculous lengths."
Judge Burger was not alone in his strong views. Judge Bastian, in
dissent, wrote that "the court today has struck a grievous blow at the
administration of justice." 3 ' The then Chief Judge Miller wrote that
the majority decision:
is another example of what I think is this court's tendency unduly
to emphasize technicalities which protect criminals and hamper
law enforcement ....
It is shocking to me that upon such tortured grounds the
court reverses the conviction of this man who has confessed to a
bizarre and brutal murder. . . . In our concern for criminals,
we should not forget that nice people have some rights, too. 232
Strong judicial criticism of Judge Wright's approach to criminal
justice was not confined to his early years on the appellate bench. In
Bailey,233 the recent case on escapes mentioned above, Judge Wiley,
dissenting, accused Judge Wright of "legerdemain." He wrote that
"[m]y colleagues are apparently prepared to labor mightily to exculpate
the defendants,"2 34 and that "the majority attempts to construct a new
haven for escaped criminals. 23 5
There are a number of criticisms directed at the work of Judge
Wright and judges like him in criminal cases. In addition to comments
of the kind just quoted, some writers have suggested that Judge Wright
pursues his own values without regard to the law.236
230. "It is inconceivable that judges would go to such lengths ignoring a reasonable balance between individual rights and protection of the public." Burger also characterized the
majority opinion as unclear in theory, "understandably" glossing over the facts, distorting
the facts, leaping to conclusions, using a red herring, distorting the statute by "interpretation," rewriting the statute, evading the critical issue, using repetition and incantation as a
substitute for facts and reasons, using sweeping generalizations and semantical devices, and
boldly invading the legislative power. Id. at 253-60 (Burger, J., joined by Miller, CJ., and
Bastian, J., dissenting).
23 1. Id. at 265 (Bastian, J.).
232. Id. (Miller, C.J.).
233. 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd,444 U.S. 394 (1980). See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
234. 585 F.2d at 1128.
235. Id. at 1129-30.
236. See Kurland, Government by Judiciary, 2 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 307, 308
(1979).
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Two Classes of Criticism

We may group these and similar criticisms along the rights/
consequences continuum. Judge Wright's critics attack his "result-orientation" and make a "neutral principles" argument. Along the activity/passivity continuum, critics argue that judicial activism invades the
province of the legislature in a democracy and exceeds the institutional
competence of the courts.2 37 Along the continuum of values intrinsic/extrinsic to the criminal process, critics charge that the values Judge
Wright implements range too far outside the criminal law. These and
similar arguments are analyzed in section IV.
Along the crime control/liberty continuum of criminal justice
goals, critics raise the "crime problem argument"-that crime is so urgent a problem that judges should interpret narrowly the constitutional
rights of defendants. This argument is analyzed in section V.
IV.

Judge Wright and Judicial Activism

J. Skelly Wright has been one of the leading activist judges in our
country's history, and criminal justice has been the field in which his
activism has been most manifest. Harsh words have been used to challenge the propriety of judicial activism, yet Judge Wright has been regarded as one of its leading defenders. 23 8 This section presents an
analysis supporting Judge Wright's contention that it is the court's
proper role to be activist "in expanding individual freedom and increasing human rights. 23 9
A.

The Debate on Activism240
The literature on judicial activism sets out many objections to a

237. See Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d at 259 (Burger, J., dissenting).
238. See Kurland, supranote 236. Professor Kurland's speech highlights Judge Wright's
role as a defender ofjudicial activism, though condemning such activism as exalting "autocracy over democracy,.. . faction over society, equality over liberty, the mass and the class
over the individual, and even mindlessness over reason." Id. at 320-21.
239. Wright, Role of the Supreme Court ina Democratic Society-JudicialAcivism or
Restraint,54 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 27 (1968).
240. The classic debate on judicial activism centers on the Supreme Court's power to
declare statutes unconstitutional. The major collections are SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME
LAW (E. Calm ed. 1954) and JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT: SELECTED
ESSAYS (L.W. Levy ed. 1967) (hereinafter cited as SELECTED ESSAYS). Two magisterial
treatments of the subject have recently appeared, J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) and J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1980). The arguments presented here parallel those of Choper;, C. BLACK,
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Bishin, JudicialReview in Democratic Theory, 50 S.
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judicial approach like Judge Wright's: that it violates the inherent nature of the judicial function; that it fails to observe neutral principles;
that the courts lack the institutional competency to set policy, cannot
properly frame problems or find facts, and have no legitimate extrinsic
source for values; that judicial activism is ultimately useless in promoting freedom, and will have an adverse effect on popular responsibility;
and that the defiance of popular will by the courts causes the public to
scorn the courts' authority, even within their proper sphere. Finally,
the core objection is that judicial activism exceeds the constitutional
mandate to the judiciary and, by intruding on the role of the elected
legislature, is essentially undemocratic.
My reply to such objections does not focus on Supreme Court declarations that acts of Congress or of a state legislature are unconstitutional. Rather, the focus of my reply is on activism as it is exercised in
the federal criminal process by judges like J. Skelly Wright, who commonly rely on common law interpretation and statutory reasoning. Issues of federalism and supposed allocation of ultimate authority
between court and Congress are thus outside the scope of this article.
This type of activism has a strong foundation. Neutral principles,
such as those supporting the liberty of a citizen, in case of doubt are as
venerable as competing principles, such as the presumption of constitutionality. The institutional characteristics of courts give them an independence from the majority which is appropriate for a decisionmaker
when individual liberties are in issue. In criminal cases, courts, more
than other institutions, have extensive experience in dealing with background facts and competing contentions regarding crime control and
civil liberties. Judicial activism in criminal cases has not had a harmful
effect on popular responsibility, but, to the contrary, has stimulated
consideration by the public, legislatures, the bar and law schools of the
applicable constitutional issues. The text of the Constitution states explicit values to be applied in criminal law cases. In applying these constitutional mandates, the courts follow a democratic tradition: they
apply standards which have been adopted by both Congress and the
several states. Moreover, it is rare in criminal cases for legislative acts
to be voided. Usually decisions of individual policemen or prosecutors
CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Rostow, The Democratic CharacterofJudicialReview, 66 HARV.

L. Rav. 193 (1952), and those of Judge Wright, see Appendix A. Ely finds "interpretivism"

to be generally impossible; he would have the courts enforce Bill of Rights provisions
because "positive law does have its claim." By way of contrast, Choper, like Judge Wright,

finds the protection of individual liberty to be the fundamental constitutional mandate
which the courts are to enforce.
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are reviewed; there is common law as well as constitutional authority
for such review.
The criticism that judicial activism is a "deviant institution" in our
democracy z4 1 is overstated. The judiciary, on examination, is not much
less democratic than the other institutions of our government. Indeed,
in many states judges are elected and must stand for re-election, though
neither fact is generally thought to be relevant to the legitimacy of their
activism. Even though Congress has greater democratic legitimacy
than do federal judges, this is much less so in the District of Columbia
where neither the Congress nor judges have been elected by the residents. Finally, a democratic community is largely defined substantively, by the fact of being a free society, rather than merely
procedurally, in terms of elections. Criminal justice activism, by judges
like J. Skelly Wright, stands as a bulwark against tendencies toward
police state tactics, and is thus vitally important to the maintenance of a
democratic society.
B.

Activism in the Federal Courts

Trial judges and intermediate appellate judges like Judge Wright
have occasion to make law when interpreting statutes, interpreting
rules of evidence or procedure, and applying, interpreting and creating
the mass of precedents which are the framework of the law in our common law system. In criminal procedure, judges regularly face great
policy conflicts which also are manifested in constitutional issues, but
the Constitution need only rarely be invoked to support a holdingwhen a federal court is overruling a state law doctrine or in a rare confrontation with Congress on a rule of criminal procedure. In the ordinary case, such as a ruling on the admissibility of evidence in a federal
prosecution, judicial activism flies other flags, such as the supervisory
powers of the federal courts over the administration of criminal justice, 24 2 statutory interpretation, 4 3 or common law doctrine. 24 Pufting
241. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
242. See generally Note, Supervisory Power in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 642 (1978) (which overlooks the unique role of the D.C. Circuit Court).
See also Ristaino v.-Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Hill, The Bill of Rights andthe Supervisory
Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181 (1969); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the
Federal Courts, 53 GEo. L.. 1050 (1965); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal
Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1963). Cf. Comment, JudiciallntegrityandJudicialReview:
An ,4rgumentfor Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129
(1973); Note, Standardsforthe Suppression ofEvidence Under the Supreme Court's Supervisory Power, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 364 (1977).
243. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (statute interpreted to avoid "constitutional doubt").
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aside the rare dispute over "ultimate" power, common law judges too
were activist and resisted legislative suzerainty over the common law
doctrinal area.
The type of activism discussed in the following sections is judicial
action in federal cases which protects and expands the rights of the
citizens in encounters with the police and prosecutors. Our nation's
history shows that prior to the last quarter century, such judicial activism was rare. Courts were long inactive on behalf of our constitutional
liberties. 4 5 Considering the suggestion that "the judges can slow the
speed and soften the force of repressions," John P. Frank wrote 24in6
1954, "[t]his is within their power, though they have never done it."
1.

Criticism of JudicialActivism as Unprincipledor Result-Oriented

Some denounce "result-oriented" jurisprudence, which evaluates
judicial activism by the result it achieves. 4 7 Much of this criticism is
not well taken. Rules are not "neutral" as between all classes of people-the rules specify that some are supposed to win and others are
supposed to lose their cases. Rules are only neutral as to factors which
it would be improper to consider. A legitimate decision should be explicable in terms of factors which our society regards as legitimate.
Judge Wright clearly believes it to be permissible for a judge to
consider the results of his decision.24 8 Such a result orientation is justified because of the doctrine of precedent. A judge must rule so as to
244. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
245. John P. Frank has said, "The dominant lesson of our history m the relation of the
judiciary to repressions is that courts love liberty most when it is under pressure least."
Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 109, 114 (E.
Cahn ed. 1954). Frank found "not a single case of real consequence in which, in 160 years,
judicial review has buttressed liberty." Id. at I11.He concluded, "If the test of the value of
judicial review to the preservation of basic liberties were to be rested solely on consideration
of actual invalidations, the balance is against judicial review." Id. at 112. See also Commager, JudicialReview andDemocracy, 19 VA. Q. 417 (1943), reprintedin SELECTED ESSAYS,
supra note 240, at 64; R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 59 (1969).
246. Frank, supra note 245, at 132. It may be that judicial activism is advisable only in
the area of criminal law and procedure, and that a "double standard" of judicial activism
should be supported. See Freund, The Supreme Court and FundamentalFreedoms, in SELECTED EsSAYS, supranote 240, and L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). See generally
CHOPER, supra note

240.
247. Leonard Levy, my first teacher of constitutional law, has written, "Whether judicial
review is democratic, then, depends largely on the results it achieves. But a result-oriented
jurisprudence corrupts the judicial process .... SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 240, at 53.
Similarly, he has also noted disapprovingly that "Much of the literature on the Supreme
Court reflects the principle of the gored ox. Attitudes toward the Court quite often depend
on whether its decisions are agreeable." Id. at 24.
248. See Wright, supra note 239, at 24.
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achieve the just or appropriate result both in the case at bar and in all
cases to be decided according to that rule in the future. The effect of
the decision on the individuals presently involved in the case enriches
the judge's appreciation of both the justice and the utility of the rule he
announces.

249

2. InstitutionalCompetency
Apart from the accusation that judges are result-oriented, critics

argue that American courts, as presently constituted, should not be activist because they are institutionally incompetent. 250 They cannot

frame problems adequately or confront broad issues in comprehensive
ways because they are limited to the issues raised in specific cases and
cannot deal with other issues until they arise, if ever they do. They
have limited fact-finding machinery, restricted to reviewing only what
the individual parties have produced for their own narrow purposes in
the adversary setting. The courts lack any value-source on which to
ground their reasoning, other than the limited text of legislative and
constitutional commands, and they have no extrinsic value-sources except those to which the legislature has superior access. 2-' They are incapable of making the kinds of decisions which cannot be based on
principle--decisions which require line drawing to make subtle and
delicate distinctions. They lack the executive, legislative and financial
resources to carry out their decisions,2 52 which only bind the parties,
249. "[Responsibility) is the greater the more one is conscious that he or she-not some
imagined entity-is acting, and the more one is conscious that the action affects not a hypothetical A but a real Helen Palsgraf." J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW xi
(1976). "The abstraction performs an effectual function in the operating machinery of law,
but the ultimate consumer of the product will always be some quite concrete individual." E.
CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 2 (1949), quoted in Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas
Corpusfor State Prisoners: The Allocation ofFact-FindingResponsibility,75 YALE L.J. 895,
898 n.13 (1966).
250. Kennedy speaks of the "institutional competence" and "political question gambits."
Result orientation requires factual inquiries into likely consequences, which only the legislature is competent to conduct. And substantive value judgments are inherently arbitrary and
subjective, and so should only be made by majority vote. Kennedy, Form andSubstance in
PrivateLawAdjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1752 (1976). Perhaps it could be said that
both "gambits" deal with institutional competence, the former to find facts and the latter to
make value choices.
251. See Ely, Yhe Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Foreword- On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978).
252. Paul Bator, for example, argued that the principal remaining tasks in criminal justice are administrative or political in nature. The court is ill-equipped to face these tasks
because of the limits of the case system and of the research available to it. Dorsen, supra
note 2, at 464-65. Judicial fact-finding was historically limited by tradition, staff and funds.
J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 412 (1950).
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and perhaps have an indirect effect on others through their precedential
value.
A simple answer to the institutional competence argument is that
the courts can overcome these limitations by making use of, or improving upon, their institutional functioning. Courts have devised methods
to improve the framing of problems. 2 3 They make use of specific cases
to confront a wide range of related issues. In Mirandav Arizona," 4 for
example, the court was able to announce its view on a considerable
number of issues, even though it was confined to the narrowly-defined
questions framed by the parties. Doctrines have been developed to
avoid dealing with issues prematurely or piecemeal.2 55 More extensive
fact-finding mechanisms have been developed. The role of amicus curiae has been extended to allow invitations to the Solicitor General to
include the knowledge and conclusions of the government25 6 to permit
organizations and governmental agencies with interests in the case to
engage in what is almost a genteel form of lobbying, 257 and to permit
appointment by the court of counsel to conduct research and make recommendations. s8 Judicial notice may be taken of "legislative facts,"
sometimes through texts revealing background facts,2 9 and cases may
be remanded with instructions to find specific facts, standard practice
or general background. 60
The courts have always had to draw lines, from the days when the
test for a perpetuity was its "inconvenience,"' 261 to the modem day decisions discussing the permissible deviations from mathematically-perfect apportionment and the extent of racial imbalance which indicates
segregation. 6 In criminal cases, judges have long had to make subtle
253. Public law litigation, for example, has gone beyond the simple model of adjudication with suits initiated and controlled by the parties, with just two sides, and judgments
made retrospectively. See Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1281-83, 1302-04 (1976).
254. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
255. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 241, at 127-33.
256. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
257. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Abraham &
Benedetti, The State Attorney General- A Friend of the Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 795
(1969); Hakman, Lobbying the Supreme Court-An Appraisalof "PoliticalScience Folklore,"
35 FORDHAM L. REv. 15 (1966); Krislov, he Amicus CuriaeBrief From Friendshp toAdvocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
259. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461-63.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc).
261. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Chan. Cas. 1, 48-49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (ch. 1681).
262. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 786, 796-97 (1973); Swam v. CharlotteMecklenberg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1971); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
528-31 (1969).
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and delicate distinctions in setting bail, as well as in passing sentence.2 6 3
Though judges lack the resources to carry out their decisions without outside aid, this is also true of the other branches of government in
our constitutional scheme of shared powers. When the other branches
cooperate with the judiciary-whether in making necessary appropriations, adopting consistent legislation, or providing United States Marshals, or, in extreme cases, troops-policies initiated by the judiciary
can be carried out as well as those initiated by other branches, for
which judicial cooperation is in turn required. Particularly in the area
of procedure, where it is the government itself which is having its actions regulated, enforcement problems are minimized if the executive
branch does not choose defiance. 2 4
When the courts have acted to overcome their institutional limitations, their critics have attacked them for taking such steps. "The critics, however, cannot have it both ways," Judge Wright points out.265
But these attacks show that the incapacity argument is often a straw,
masking objections founded upon other grounds which will be discussed below.
More important, whatever the courts' institutional limitations, in
Judge Wright's words, "[i]f the legislature simply cannot or does not act
to correct an unconstitutional status quo, the Court, despite all its inca'

pacities, must finally act to do

so. 266

3. The Special InstitutionalCompetence of Courts
Criticisms of the courts' institutional incompetence reflect, in part,
the assumption that it is less useful for courts to do what the other
branches are designed to do and do better, and that the courts' special
263. See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973);
D.A. THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT: THE SEARCH FOR STRUCTURED DISCRETION
IN SENTENCING, 1860-1910 (1979); Dershowitz, CriminalSentencing in the UnitedStates, 423
ANNALS 117 (1976); Sellin, The Grantingof Probation: The TrialJudge's Dilemma,A Criminologist's View, in PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 99, 100 (S.Glueck ed. 1933).
264. But compliance with the Court's decision sometimes takes a major resource commitment, see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
265. Wright, supra note 239, at 5.
266. Id. at 6. As Archibald Cox has said: "[T]he need for judicial action is strongest in
the areas of the law where political processes prove inadequate, not from lack of legislative
power but because the problem is neglected by politicians." Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
Term, Foreword: Constitutional.djudicationandthe PromotionofHuman Rights, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 91, 122 (1966). Ralph Winter goes too far when he says, "answers like 'No one else
would act' are part of a dialogue about authoritarian rather than democratic rule." Winter,
Growth ofludiclalPower,in JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 29, 63 (L. Theberge ed.
1979).
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role is to take advantage of the distinguishing features of their institu-

tional structure to perform functions for which their structure particularly qualifies them. The institutional viewpoint may be turned against
the critics. Judge Wright has identified several institutional competen-

cies of the court justifying activism, for reasons relating to judicial integrity, majority long-term values, minority interests and individual
claims.
First, he notes that:
The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process, unlike
reapportionment, is a task for which the judiciary has a special
competence and a special responsibility. It is only by seeing the
criminal process as it functions in actual cases that the areas
where constitutional rights are threatened, and the remedies required to vindicate them, become evident.2 67
Second, courts' relative insulation from short-term electoral swings
makes them able to preserve the enduring values of the people despite
short-range shifts in values.26 8 "[Jiust as an individual may be untrue
to himself, so may society be untrue to itself," Judge Wright has writ-

ten.2 6 9 "The Court's reviewing function then can be seen as an attempt
to keep the community true to its own fundamental principles. Maintaining these 'enduring general values' of the community is a 270
task for
which the Court's structure makes it particularly well suited."
Third, the courts' relative insulation from the pressures of the ma-

jority makes them an institution more capable than others of protecting
the minority.
Criminal defendants as such are not likely to be a popular group.
And for those most subject to arrest and to the abuses of the
criminal processes, the poor, the Negro, and the poor Negro,
even less legislative concern is to be expected. Their plight at the
hands of the police is not likely to inspire legislative empathy,
and their rights, constitutional and otherwise, will almost surely
267. Wright, supra note 239, at 24.
268. Ratner, Constitutions,Majoritarianism,andJudicialReview: The Function of a Billof
Rights in Israeland the United States. 26 AM. J. COMp. L. 373 (1978). The proposition in
the text may supply an answer to Professor Ely's paradox: "it simply makes no sense to
employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehiclefor protecting minoritiesfrom the
value judgments of the majority." Ely, supra note 251, at 52 (efphasis in original).
Thus the court is "the people's institutionalized means 4f self-control." C. BLACK,
supra note 240, at 107. "Their insulation and the marvelous my tery of time gives courts the
capacity to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have
been forgotten in the moment's hue and cry." A. BICKEL, supra note 241, at 26. The court
has the institutional structure which gives the opportunity for "the sober second thought."
Stone, Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. Rv.4, 25 (1936).
269. Wright, supra note 239, at 12.
270. Id.
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go unprotected without judicial intervention.27 '
Fourth, because judicial action arises out of cases involving individuals, it is especially capable of protecting the individual as required
272
by the Bill of Rights, whatever the desire of the current majority.
Judge Wright has written:
[T]he courts, alone among the three branches of government, act
at the behest of the individual citizens who invoke their jurisdiction and the judicial decisions always affect individual lives ...
[I]t is claimed that judicial review is anomalously undemocratic,
and if by that one means that it is often counter-majoritarian, the
point must be conceded. But in another sense, the courts are the
most democratic institutions we have. . . . [T]he judiciary is different from the political process. It is in the nature of courts that
they cannot close their doors to individuals seeking justice ...
The judiciary is thus the only branch of government which can
truly be said to have adopted Dr. Seuss' gentle maxim--"A person's a person, no matter how small." 27 3
Judge Wright concludes that the court is thus "uniquely capable" to
make "the delicate balance. . between principle and pragmatism, between long term, broad-based policy and short term, individualized
justice."' 274
Finally, institutional incompetence arguments must specifically
fail as regards criminal cases. In these cases, the government is always
a party, and so it can bring to bear both the extensive experience of the
prosecutor's office and its own resources for factual inquiry; in many
cases, a public defender's office is also involved, with its own store of
experience. The courts, because of the great number of criminal cases
handled, have the same type of expertise in this field as critics ascribe to
administrative agencies which work in other fields. In criminal justice
administration, moreover, there is no appropriate administrative
agency. The court is the only institution with experience in seeking the
dual goals of crime control and protection of liberty; there exists no
other governmental body with that dual vision.275
271. Id. at 23.
The individual
272. "A vote for a candidate does not give him a carte blanche ....
voter actually participates in, and thus directly consents to, almost none of the governmental
decisions that are made in his name. His power to challenge particular decisions in the
courts is theoretically necessary to the claim that governmental officials act with his consent." Wright, ProfessorBickel, The Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84 HRv.
L. REV. 769, 787-88 (1971).
273. Wright, No Matter How Small, 58 MAss. L.Q. 9, 10-11 (1973).
274. Id. at 13.
275. Cf. text at note 248 supra.
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Effect on Popular Responsibility

Another argument against judicial activism is that it will have an
adverse effect on popular responsibility.27 6 Judge Wright rejects this
argument based on his understanding of the experience of American

courts. When the court upholds a repressive practice, it does not evoke
popular defense of constitutional principles; rather, the practice is legitimated in the public eye.27 7 Conversely, when the court strikes down a
statute as unconstitutional, it may draw people's attention to long-term

values.2 78 For example, when the Supreme Court upheld a flag salute
requirement despite the-religious objections of Jehovah's Witnesses, a
wave of repression was unleashed, which only evaporated when the
Court reversed itself." 9 The Court's refusal to stand against the Japanese-American exclusion orders in World War II evoked no popular
outcry for civil rights; instead there was general complacency and support for the detention in concentration camps of American citizens,
against whom no evidence of disloyalty existed.2 ° The Court's pathbreaking in desegregation" 1 did not undermine a popular commitment
to racial justice; on the contrary, it sensitized the public.2 82 In criminal
justice above all, the judicial activism of the 1960's alerted the nation,
the bar and the law schools to the issues of the treatment of defendants
and the role of the police. Judge Wright concludes that the courts can

be characterized, not as having usurped sovereignty, but as the "conscience of a sovereign people."28' 3
276. See J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-04, 106-07 (1901); Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). See also
A. BICKEL, supra note 241, at 21-22; Hand, Contributionof an Independent Judiciaryto Civilization, in THE SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1629-1942 (1942).
277. See C. BLACK, supra note 240, at 34-86 (1960).
278. Compare Leonard Levy's comment, "[Validation by the Court of legislation adversely affecting civil liberties ends debate without stimulating the democratic process; judicial review can promote the debate and the process." SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 240, at
56.
279. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally D. MANWARING, RENDER
UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962). See also Heller, A Turning Point
for Religious Liberty, 29 VA. L. REV. 440, 449 (1943).
280. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945), reprintedin E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN
PREROGATIVE 193-266 (1962).
281. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
282. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codedat
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)).
283. Wright, The Role of the Courts: Conscience of a Sovereign People, 29 The Reporter,
Sept. 26, 1963, at 27, col. 1. See Roche, JudicialSef-Restraint, 49 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 761,
771 (1973). "The Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational body, and the Jus-
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Power grows with prudent use. This is true of the power to protect
the rights of the people.2 84 Courts which hesitate to curb police excess,
in Judge Wright's view, could hardly be counted on to do so should the
troops start marching down Pennsylvania Avenue. Furthermore, judicial activism, in addition to having desirable effects on long-term values, may also quiet causes of unrest 285 in the short-run, and thereby
promote community cooperation with the police.2 86
D.

Constitutional Choices of Basic Values

The text of the Bill of Rights does not dictate specific answers to
the detailed questions courts face. The "majestic generalities of the Bill
of Rights,"2 7 its "bold broad terms,"2'88 require interpretation. As a

general matter of constitutional interpretation, some believe that it is
not usually possible to answer constitutional questions by interpreting
the text of the Constitution,2 8 9 and that extrinsic sources for values are
290
either unavailable or are better interpreted by the political branches.
Others believe that the courts can discover in our society's traditions
consensus on fundamental principles. 29 1 A number of methods have
been used to interpret the Bill of Rights, sometimes considering the
intent of the Framers,2 92 sometimes common law history,29 3 sometimes
tices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar." Rostow, supra note 240, at 208.
"The court holds a unique place in the cultivating of our national intelligence. Other institutions may be more direct in their teaching influence. But no other institution is more deeply
decisive in its effect upon our understanding of ourselves and our government." A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 32

(1960). See also Wright, Politicsand the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976) (referring to "the Supreme Court's role as teacher to the nation"); Foote, infra note
286.
284. The "theory of constant growth of capital" is critically discussed in J. CHOPER,
supra note 240, at 161-64.
285. "[D]efense of civil rights by the courts is a force not only for democratic values but
for social order." Rostow, supra note 240, at 207.
286. Caleb Foote similarly suggests that "the effect of restrictive law upon police activity
may be just the opposite of what is generally assumed. . . . [T]he seed of lawful operation
[may lead]. . . to a harvest of public respect and cooperation." Foote, The FourthAmendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law ofArrest, 51 J. ClaM. L.C.&P.S. 405 (1960).
287. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
288. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 195 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
289. See Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its 411ure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399
(1978); cf. Berger, Government by Judiciary: John HartEly's "Tnvitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277
(1979) (criticizing Ely). See also ELY, supra note 240.
290. Ely, supra note 251. See also ELY, supra note 240.
291. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 246-47, 265-72, 280, 293, 310-11 (1973).
292. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-75, 92-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (incorporation of
the Bill of Rights); Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887); L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION
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the consensus of state constitutions or court decisions, 2 4 sometimes the
"considered consensus of the English-speaking world," 295 and some296
times the interpretation provided by Congress.
Judge J. Skelly Wright finds in the Constitution a fundamental
value choice, whose mandate the courts are to construe and apply. He
finds this fundamental mandate to be the protection of individual liberty.29 7 Whether or not "interpretivism" is a possible general judicial
strategy in constitutional law, and whether or not judges may legitimately go outside the constitutional text for their values, Judge Wright
finds the Bill of Rights to be, not merely "positive law," 298 but also the
record of a constitutionalchoice of basic values:
Judges do have guidelines in determining issues involving fundamental rights. The guidance comes from the provisions of the
Constitution itself. These are the a priori principles judges must
apply-these are the basic value choices judges must accept-the
Framers made them... Filling in the majestic constitutional
outlines does require making additional value choices. But the
point is that the additional value choices must be made only
within the parameters of the major value choices already embedded in the constitutional language.2 99
The words in the text do not "provide a certain or mechanical
guide to decision"; judges share the responsibility of implementing the
Bill of Rights' basic constitutional decisions on values. But "judicial
judgments based on similar [imprecise] guides are made routinely" in
many fields of law, Judge Wright has pointed out.3" Indeed, throughout the criminal process, whether by policeman or prosecutor or prison
official, judgments have to be made and are made, with even less guidvii-viii, 236-37 (1960); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,2 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (1949).
293. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Inv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277
(1855) (due process) ("settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common law
of England" at the time).
294. Justice Frankfurter noted, for example, that the constitution of every state contains
a clause like the Fourth Amendment and often in its precise wording. See Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 160 (1947).
295. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) (defendant's right to testify).
296. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1378-80 (1980).
297. See Wright, supranote 239, at 13.
298. See ELY, supra note 240.
299. Wright, The Scholars andthe Supreme Court, 26 REc. A.B. N.Y. Cm-y 567, 572-73
(1971).
300. Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remediesfor De Facto Segregation, in
Symposium: De Facto School Segregation, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 478, 495 (1965). See also
Wright, supra note 194.
OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICA
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ing authority than is available to judges.3 01
How do judges fill in these constitutional outlines? Presumptions
are an important tool of judicial decisionmaking; the Framers' basic
value choice alters the usual presumptions. The famous footnote 4 in
CaroleneProducts3" 2 began, "[T]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when the legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments . .. .
But there is no substitute for the good faith commitment on the part of a judge to seek to
apply those basic values. As Justice Black put it, "The call for the true
application of the Seventh Amendment is not to words, but to the spirit
' 3 °4
of honest desire to see that constitutional right preserved.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights, in its references to criminal law,
is not one of vigilance lest a criminal escape, as might today be written
into a constitution, but one of vigilance lest law enforcement trench
upon freedom. The generation which produced our Bill of Rights did
not complain that the government was insufficiently effective in fighting
crime, but rather that writs of assistance, general warrants, and "efficient" law enforcement in vice-admiralty courts were depriving Americans of their rights. "A government dedicated to liberty," Judge
Wright has written, "was more a visionary than a realistic enterprise in
those days. The world had scarcely known such a creature. But the
Framers persevered."3 ' The Framers' concern was not that "national
security" be protected, but rather that the "people's security" be protected; "the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures" was buttressed by high standards for the issu301. "One of the most important discoveries about the nature of police work was the
realization that police officers make discretionary decisions, even very important ones, in the
course of their tours of duty. . . .Legal commentators were alarmed by the seeming paradox of the superior powers of the ministerial, as compared to the magisterial, functionaries
of the state." Rumbaut & Bittner, supra note 220, at 243. See also Goldstein, PoliceDiscrelion Not to Invoke the CriminalProcess: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of
Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT
INTO CUSTODY (1965).
302. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
303. Id. at 152-53.
304. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
305. Wright, Politicsand the Constitution.-Is Money Speech, supra note 283, at 1020-21.
The cluster of criminal law values chosen in the Bill of Rights may be described by such
terms as: the liberty of the citizen, prevention of tyranny, the right of the people to be secure
in their privacy, the dignity and autonomy of the individual, fairness, factual accuracy, protection of the innocent, restriction of police, judicial control over investigation and trial,
integrity of the courts, and equal treatment.
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ance of warrants. 30 6 Rather than a declaration that "the confession is
the queen of evidence," the Fifth Amendment gives us a rule against
self-incrimination.30 7 Rather than a rule that "sufficient bail shall be
required to insure preventive detention of those thought to be dangerous," the Eighth Amendment makes explicit the rule that "excessive
bail shall not be required."30 8
Judge Wright has noted that these values "civilize" criminal procedure:
It is true that the Court has insisted on civilized procedures in
state as well as federal criminal courts . . . . How long should
the Supreme Court have waited for the states to civilize their own
criminal procedures before it undertook to protect the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime? And civilizing of state
criminal procedures under gentle urgings from the Supreme
Court has been going on since Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 289
(1936), where the Court set aside a death sentence based solely
30 9 on
a confession obtained by hanging the accused from a tree.
E.

Judicial Activism in a Free Country: Conclusion

A basic ground for criticizing judicial activism is that it invades
the province of the elected legislature in a democratic society. Judicial
review is "a deviant institution in the American Democracy," wrote
Alexander Bickel.31 ° Justice Frankfurter noted that courts are "inher'3 1
ently oligarchic." '
The democracy argument may be countered in many ways, some
of which have been set out above. First, the argument is irrelevent to
the District of Columbia, where neither Congress nor the judges are
elected,31 2 just as it is in states where both the legislature and the judges
are elected. Such factual details have not hindered critics of Judge
Wright's activism, an observation which lends support to William
Bishin's suggestion that the resort to the terminology of democratic the306. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
307. Id. amend. V.

308. Id. amend. VIII.
309. Wright, Symposium, supra note 300, at 499-500. As Louis Schwartz wrote a generation ago: "[T]he worth of a society will eventually be reckoned not in proportion to the
number of criminals it crucifies, bums, hangs or imprisons, but rather by the degree of liberty experienced by the great body of its citizenry. There have never been more determined
law enforcers than Nazi Germany or the Soviet." Schwartz, On CurrentProposalsto Legalize Wiretapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 158 (1954).
310. A. BICKEL, supra note 241.
311. AFL v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
312. See Introduction supra.
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ory is a suspect mode of argument, not consistently applied.3 1 3 Second,
what has occurred in the nation is less a growth in judicial power than

a growth in legislative and executive power accompanied by an increase in judicially-enforced limitations on that power.3 14 Third, judicial activism is in several ways authorized by the people. 3 5 Fourth, to
the extent that judicial activism is antimajoritarian, it is a legitimate
part of our democratic system. 3 t6 Fifth, judicial activism is hardly, as
Bickel would have it, "a deviant institution in the American Democracy." Our governmental system is, after all, a republic of indirect rule

by the people, rather than a democracy of direct popular rule;3 17 it is
purposefully antimajoritarian. Moreover, even apart from its republican and antimajoritarian aspects, our system, both in principle and in
practice, has other nondemocratic elements.3 18 That federal judges are
313. Bishin, supra note 240, at 1128.
314. The so-called growth in judicial power is, in large part, a resistance to a growth in
power of the national government. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942). In
particular, the expanded role of the federal courts over federal law enforcement followed an
expanded role of federal law enforcement.
While review by federal judges of state criminal processes is outside the scope of this
article, one may note that the original forays of the federal courts in limiting state law enforcement came about as responses to "activist" state law enforcement, including the use of
torture, lynch mobs and the like by state investigators against black defendants.
315. As Dean Rostow argues, the weight of history shows that the American people have
accepted judicial activism as "one of their main protections against the possibility of abuse
by Presidents and legislatures." Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NoTRE DAME LAW. 573, 590 (1958).
316. The Framers of the original articles never intended democratic values to be manifest through a pure majoritarian system. There are a number of structural aspects of our
legislative institutions which were included in the Constitution to protect nonmajoritarian
interests. "[A] thoroughgoing majoritarianism is inconsistent with the very idea of limitedthat is to say-Constitutional, government." Wright, supra note 239, at 10. Our Constitution was set up as much to limit, as to effectuate, majority rule. The institutions of checks
and balances (including bicameralism, the veto and Senate "advise and consent" power)
were purposefully established to limit the transient majority, as were many electoral devices.
As Judge Wright has noted, "the Constitution itself sets out certain areas as simply
beyond the reach of the present majority. Is the Constitution itself then a deviant document
in our democracy?" Id See also Justice Jackson's discussion of the Bill of Rights in West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barrette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
317. However one characterizes the system, elections give the people little control over
the government. A choice between two candidates affords little control over any one issue
since the electorate must buy a package of positions with little guarantee that any of those
political planks will be followed. And between elections, in our system of fixed terms, the
officials are neither controllable nor accountable. Furthermore, though we boast that we
have government by the people, many are not permitted to vote and many eligible personssometimes the majority of eligible persons-do not vote at all. See J. CHOPER, supra note
240, at 12-16; R. DAHL, supra note 245, at 130-32.
318. Aspects of our system of government which are nondemocratic include the congressional rules of seniority, which vest disproportionate power in certain stable districts whose
representatives serve as committee chairmen, and the senatorial filibuster rule which is in-
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selected by an indirectly democratic process, and preside over courts
which have certain undemocratic aspects, hardly makes their activism
"deviant"; they are in many respects as democratic as the other
branches of government. 19 Finally, the democracy argument undervalues the extent to which substantive conditions, rather than the mere
forms of selection of officials, define a society as democratic; judicial
activism is a vital component in our society's striving toward its democratic ideals.

V.

The "Crime Problem"

Another type of criticism to which activism such as Judge Wright's
is subjected is the "crime problem argument" which, stated simply, is a
consequentialist position contending that ordinary crime is a public

problem of crisis proportions, that judicial decisions which interfere
with crime control are therefore to be avoided, and that the Bill of
Rights should be construed accordingly. In the words of Delmar
Karlen, "[s]upporters of the police. . . feel that the social danger from
widespread criminal activity is so great that all doubts about the extent
tended to give a veto power to a minority of thirty-four Senators (representing less than 10%
of the population) who can defeat a cloture motion. Moreover, a handful of senators can
talk a bill to death even if cloture has been approved.
Outside the legislative branch, most powers are exercised by officials who are not
elected. Rostow pointed out the vast powers exercised by generals and admirals, who are
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, just as arc judges. Hazard adds
"all but a few holders of public and private offices in this countn are selected by some
procedure other than popular election." Administrative agencies, for example, have been
called a "fourth," and unelected, branch of government. Rostow, srvra note 315.
319. American judges are elected according to democratic principles, though not in a
pure form. Federal judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. They are thus selected by representatives elected by the people"elected at second degree." Furthermore, judges remain accountable to the dominant consensus, in large part because they are expected to write opinions explaining what they do.
Many state judges have the directly democratic legitimacy of elections: they are elected
directly by the people. Sometimes state judicial candidates are supported or opposed on the
basis of implicit or explicit platforms. Elected judges are accountable to the public and must
stand for periodic re-election.
Judicial power is also restrained within popular bounds by its dependence upon appropriations, implementing legislation, executive enforcement and other forms of cooperation
by other branches. More formally, the federal appellate power is subject to such exceptions
and regulations as the Congress may make. "[E]xperience shows that there is not enough
power in any five or nine appointive officials long to resist the overwhelming demands of
democracy."
Federal judges are also accountable in the sense that they can be removed through
impeachment. Though federal judges are not subject to re-election by popular vote, they are
nonetheless removable by legislators whose choice not to use the impeachment power stems
from their own reading of the will of the people. The impeachment machinery thus provides
a linkage to popular sentiment allowing for ultimate accountability.

Summer 19801

GREAT EXECUTIVE HAND

of police power ought to be resolved in favor of the police." 2 ' Proponents of the crime problem argument reason that the presence of a "significant economic and social problem" justifies a narrow interpretation
of the Bill of Rights.32 '
In contrast, the position taken by Judge Wright recognizes other
goals, in addition to crime control, as relevant to the criminal process.
These values include deterrence of unconstitutional police practices,
avoiding the excesses of the police of totalitarian regimes, protecting
the privacy of those not prosecuted and of those who are, and preserving judicial integrity. 3 2 Implicit in Judge Wright's reasoning is the position that the crime problem argument is irrelevant to Bill of Rights
issues. From a formalist position, if the Constitution grants the defendant rights, they should be recognized whether crime is a large or small
problem. Similarly, if one believes that the function of the criminal
court is simply to decide guilt or innocence, the magnitude of the crime
problem is irrelevant. Even if one believes that the heinousness of the
particular crime or the evil character of the defendant might sometimes
be relevant to the decision on the extent of his rights, the magnitude of
the overall crime problem still should not be regarded as relevant.
A.

Seeing the Crime Problem in Context
In considering the crime problem in context, there are conflicting

320. D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 99 (1967).

"We are not yet so far from the jungle that self-preservation has ceased to be our basic
instinct. Crime threatens self-preservation and stimulates age-old emotions. The most dangerous of these is fear... Fear can destroy our desire for justice itself... We are prepared to deny justice to obtain what unreasoning, overpowering emotion falsely tells us will
be security. Arm yourself, suppress dissent, invade privacy, urge police to trick and deceive,
force confessions, jail without trial, brutalize in prisons, execute the poor and the weak. Due
process can wait-we want safety." R. CLARK, CRIME

IN AMERICA

7 (1970).

321. Thus, for example, the "significant economic and social problem" of illegal immi-.
gration from Mexico was taken into account by the Supreme Court in deciding on the scope
of government power to stop cars and check for illegal immigrants. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See also Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1389

(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
One may draw an analogy with the Court's statement in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944), that an "apprehension by the proper military authorities of the
gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify" the confinement of
Americans in concentration camps.
The crime argument, however, does not always prevail. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 657-58 (1979).
322. These competing goals might be characterized, to use the traditional language, as
establishing justice, insuring the blessings of liberty, providing equal protection of the laws,
providing due process of law, and guaranteeing the right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable police intrusion. See U.S. CONST. preamble, amend. IV, V & XIV, § 1.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:907

definitions of which activities are to be regarded as criminal,32 3 though
"ordinary crime. -"crime in the street," or "index crime"-is criminal
by any definition. It inflicts harm, is prohibited by law, is regarded as
blameworthy,3 2 4 and leads to conviction. In contrast, "white collar
crime," though it inflicts harm and is prohibited by law, is only ambivalently regarded as blameworthy and much less frequently leads to
conviction. With some exaggeration one might call this "invisible
crime," for it is much less in the public eye. A third type of activity
inflicts harm-sometimes of vast extent-but satisfies no other definition of crime. One may call such acts "candidate crimes" since the
extent of harm caused renders them potential candidates for legislative
redefinition as criminal.3 25
There is insufficient data to allow a comparison of the social costs
imposed by ordinary crime, invisible crime and candidate crime. Sta-

tistics are of differing reliability, and are for different years, requiring
adjustment both for demographic shifts and inflation.32 6 The use of
323. Some take the positivist stance that crime is whatever behavior is denounced by a
criminal code, while others take the extreme view that only those who are detected and
convicted are criminal. Such definitions of course give no clue as to what activity ought to
be regarded as criminal. Normative as well as descriptive definitions are, however, available. Bentham, for example, in addition to a positivist definition of what is currently criminal, offered a utilitarian definition of what should be regarded as a crime: an act it is
deemed necessary to forbid because of the "harm which it produces" or tends to produce.
Some modem economists similarly have defined crime as activity which produces "uncompensated external diseconomies" (Ze., costs to outsiders), or have considered the "social
cost" of the activity, including expenditures for protection and deterrence, or have considered both costs of breach (including expenditures for protection) and costs of error .(wrongfully imposed sanctions). In contrast to definitions based on costs inflicted, some modem
writers still say that "the actual harm itself is immaterial to the criminal law" and see crime
as defined solely in terms of blameworthiness, the measurement of the accused's behavior
against some ideal standard.
324. See C.R. BARTOL, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: A PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH (1980);
Gray, The Costs of Crime: Review and Overview, in THE COSTS OF CRIME 19 (C. Gray ed.
1979); Tappan, Who is the Criminal? 12 AM. Soc. REV. 100 (1947).
325. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT

102-09 (1967) (hereinafter cited as COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT).
326. For one thing, the statistics on the crime problem have long been recognized as
inaccurate. See F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 97 (1980). Moreover, many feel that the public fear of crime has in large part been built up by politicians.
See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, supra note 202, at 2. Morris and Hawkins argue that calculations of the "cost of crime" usually commit the "economic absurdity" of aggregating diverse categories, e.g., vandalism and prostitution. Id. at 38-39. They conclude that "What is
sometimes called 'the ultimate cost of crime'-a global total of national income as it would
be if there were no crime-involves making so many cosmic assumptions that realistic economic analysis is impossible." Id. at 39.
Similarly, the Wickersham Commission Report on the Cost of Crime (1931) concluded
that a "lump sum estimate of the total cost of crime" could not be validly arrived at in
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different definitions and varying methods of estimation has yielded
noncomparable figures. Nevertheless, some data is available to refute
greater
the claim that ordinary crime is a danger32disproportionately
7
than the other background risks in society.
For policy discussion, risks created by ordinary crime should be
put in perspective by comparing them to those created by invisible and
candidate crime. The incidence of death, injury, illness and property
loss from ordinary crime in the streets must be compared to that
caused, for example, by industry through environmental pollution, occupational hazards, sale of products inherently harmful (such as cigarettes), and sale of products unsafe because of design or production
defects (such as automobiles). 2 8
Notwithstanding the limited data, the quantifiable harm inflicted
by "ordinary crime" can be shown to be far less than the harm to society inflicted by invisible and candidate crime in lives lost and dollar
costs. 329 Yet, notwithstanding the danger and magnitude of white colprinciple, as well as in practice. "What have we learned since 1931?" ask F. ZIMRING & R.
FRASE, supra note 323, at 97. They raise questions about the attempt to construct an overall
index of total crime, id. at 87-98, among which is the problem of including crimes which are
sui generis to the victim, like murder and rape. Id. at 70, 94-95.
327. As a quantitative measure of ordinary crime, the least useful figures are rates such
as the FBI "crime clock," measuring incidents per minute. The Uniform Crime Reports
figures, which measure the number of incidents reported to the authorities and their rate per
total population, are not adequate either. More valuable are the Criminal Victimization
Surveys of the U.S. Department of Justice, which attempt to find the total number of incidents, reported or unreported, and calculate rates for various demographic groups. These
official reports do not, however, attempt to sum up the magnitude as distinguished from
incidence or rate of the ordinary crime problem. While some believe such calculations are
in principle misleading, other analysts occasionally attempt to calculate such figures. "['!he
amount of pain that crime causes is a minute fraction of the amount Americans suffer accidentally every year. There were approximately 10,000 willful homicides in 1965 and more
than 40,000 motor-vehicle fatalities. There were slightly more than 100 serious assaults for
every 100,000 Americans, and more than 12,000 injuries due to accidents in the home for
every 100,000 Americans." COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 327, at 3.
328. Such a comparison might be undertaken using such measures as: (1) Injuries to life
in number of deaths, persons injured, or person-days of hospitalization or disability; (2)
Injuries to property, measured in terms of dollar amount destroyed or transferred; and (3)
Injuries to other values, such as privacy and liberty, resulting, for example, from fear and
reduced mobility. See Caliabresi & Melamed, ProperyRules,Liabity Rules,andInalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV.1089 (1972).
329. The likelihood that a person will be a victim of a serious personal attack in a given
year is about one in 550. For those who are not slum dwellers, and who are not young
adults, the risk is considerably less. COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, supranote 327, at 19.

Perhaps surprisingly, "the risk of serious attack from spouses, family members, friends or
acquaintances is almost twice as great as it is from strangers on the street." Id. While
ordinary stranger crime is less of a danger than many believe, candidate crimes produce
significant social costs which are far more likely to affect the individual. A number of empirical studies have shown that alcohol was used by at least half the offenders directly prior
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lar and invisible crime, they are not objects of widespread fear and calls
33 °
for singleminded repression.

The conclusion might be drawn that, just as our society tolerates
much invisible and candidate crime because to crackdown on them
would be too costly in terms of our freedom, so too, a single-minded
crusade against ordinary crime might be tempered by similar concerns
for its cost in terms of freedom.
Perhaps the reason for the disproportionate reaction to ordinary
crime is that:
[T]o suffer deliberate violence is different from experiencing an
accident, illness or other misfortune. In violent crime man beto committing homicide and other assaultive crimes; in these alcohol-related violent crimes,
the victims are usually relatives or friends who were drinking with the offenders. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has reported that most well-controlled research studies indicate that alcohol is involved in from one-third to one-half of the 48,000
fatalities yearly from auto crashes. The President's Crime Commission estimated that the
economic impact of driving under the influence was $1.8 billion in 1967.
The social harm inflicted by cigarette use is similarly vast. The Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare has concluded that "[S]moking is the largest preventable cause of
death in America." The number of deaths each year identified by demographers as caused
by diseases related to cigarette smoking include 80,000 from lung cancer, 22,000 from other
cancers, up to 225,000 from cardiovascular disease, and more than 19,000 from chronic pulmonary disease, a total of almost 350,000 deaths a year. The number of deaths caused each
year by smoking is thus over one-sixth of the approximately 2 million total deaths in
America annually.
Estimates of the number of deaths caused by work-related diseases range from 100,000
annually, from all causes, to a minimum of 70,000 deaths annually, from occupational cancers alone, and 150,000 deaths annually just from occupational respiratory diseases.
As to illness, estimates of the number of new cases of disabling occupational illnesses
occurring annually range from at least 390,000 to an estimate of almost 3 out of every 10
workers, suggested by an extensive field survey on the incidence of illness to those exposed
on the job to substances regulated as hazardous by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration.
The number of deaths each year caused by occupational accidents is estimated at
14,200, while the estimated number of disabling occupational injuries annually is 2 million.
One author suggests that half of all worker accidents are caused by illegal safety violations
or dangerous, but legal, conditions.
White Collar Crime. The Congressional Joint Economic Committee has concluded that
the costs of white collar crime (excluding antitrust violations) are about ten times as large as
the cost of ordinary crimes against property, such as burglary or robbery. The total shortterm, direct cost of all white collar crime, excluding antitrust violations, was estimated by
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1974 at no less than $40 billion annually.
The Internal Revenue Service estimates that individuals in the legal sector of the economy fail to report $75 to $100 billion annually, causing a revenue loss of $13 to $17 billion,
double the lost tax revenue from illegal activities, and several times greater than the amount
of property stolen in ordinary crime. Documentation and discussion of the figures given in
this footnote, omitted here for reasons of space, will appear in a subsequent article.
330. This lack of proportion is not limited to crime. It is clear that popular fear and
outrage about activities causing death and injury correlate neither with the number of deaths
nor with the risk measured by the death rate.
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comes a wolf to man, threatening or destroying the personal
safety of his victim in a terrifying act. Violent crime (particularly
street crime) engenders fear-the deep-seated fear of the hunted
in the presence of the hunter. Today this fear is gnawing at the
vitals of urban America. ....
Fear of crime is destroying some of the basic human freedoms which any society is supposed to safeguard-freedom of
movement, freedom from harm, freedom from fear itself.3 3 '
Though invisible and candidate crimes cause deaths also, often

they are perceived as not intentional, or as not violating civilized morality. Much of the harm caused by invisible or candidate crime is due
to recklessness or risk-taking, and is the anticipated but unintended byproduct of the pursuit of other goals.33 2 Moreover, ordinary crime may

stir unconscious fears, stemming from childhood, in a way that less personalized dangers will not.3 33 Such fears may also be paranoid, or racist.

33 4

Lastly, while concern over health and accidents may be channeled
into other outlets, such as personal medical attention and fund-raising
campaigns, ordinary crime is the business of the government. The pub331.

NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, FINAL RE-

To ESTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY 16 (1970).
Furestenberg has observed, however, that those most concerned about the problem of
violent crime are those who are least victimized by it. See Furestenberg, Public Reaction to
PORT,

Crime in the Streets, 40 AM. SCHOLAR 601, 605 (1971).

332. There is a tendency to view white collar crime in the context of its association with
otherwise acceptable behavior. Walsh & Schrom, The Victim of White CollarCrime: Acuser
orAccused,in WHITE COLLAR CRIMES: THEORY AND RESEARCH 36 (G. Geis & E. Stotland
eds. 1980).
333. "Perhaps the most intense concern about crime is the fear of being attacked by a
stranger when out alone." COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 327, at 50. The
"stranger is a menace." Brooks, The Fearof Crime in the UnitedStates, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 241 (1974).
334. In addition, the crimes the middle class fears are the crimes of the poor;, the crimes
which are invisible to them, or are deemed non-crimes, are those of the middle class. R.
CLARK, CRIME INAMERICA 36-38 (1970). Ordinary crime may be regarded as to extraordinary a danger because it is perceived as what "they"--the poor, young, and black and
brown-do to "us"--the middle class, adult, white. Other problems may strike less fear in
us because it is what "we" as a class do to "ourselves." Judicial activism may be criticized
because it is perceived as an attempt to protect "their" rights against "our" measures.
While "they"---the poor, the young, the blacks-are objectively the most frequent victims of ordinary crime, they perceive single-minded police activity as being targeted on them
also. Circuit Judge McMillan has referred to "our current system of justice, with its paranoia about the increasing crime rate." McMillan, Is There 4nything Left of the Fourth
4mendaent?,24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1,9 (1979). "iTnhere is no doubt that innocuously worded
statements about crime or crime control may be construed to be--and indeed sometimes
are-veiled slurs against ethnic and social groups." J. SCHEUER, To WALK THE STREETS
SAFELY: THE ROLE OF MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM 17 (1969).
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lic is unable to ameliorate its fears of crime, and as a result, is all the
more afraid and frustrated. At the same time government officials have
stressed the statistics of index crimes, and the media has over-reported
crime incidents.
For all these reasons the public has failed to place the problem of
ordinary crime in the Wider factual setting of invisible and candidate
crime, though the latter are more widespread by objective measures.
Though "[t]here is too much crime, far too much avoidable human suffering from crime . . . [there is also] . . .grossly too much fear of
crime." 3 "5 The unfortunate by-product of this fear is a zealous wish to
see crime suppressed even at the cost of Bill of Rights guarantees.
While some judges might be persuaded in the name of "crime control" to do violence to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Bill of Rights,
Judge Wright has preferred to preserve the value choices of the Framers. In the process he has helped to "civilize" the nation's law of criminal procedure.

Conclusion
The spirit of liberty brought many of our forefathers to these
shores, animated the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments,
and inspired our battles against totalitarianism. The defense of that
heritage calls forth heroes, just as does the defense of the country from
external enemies. Indeed, as Judge Wright has written, it is the free
heritage of our country that makes it worth defending.3 36 History will
record judges like J. Skelly Wright as among America's heroes.

335. N. Moituus & G. HAWKiNS, supra note 202, at 31.
336. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 604 (1975).

APPENDIX A: JUDGE WRIGHT'S
NON-JUDICIAL WRITINGS
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Foreword(in Selected Topics: United States Supreme Court 19771978 Term), 16 A. CRiM. L. REV. 1 (1978).
Criminal Correctionandthe Law, TRIAL, Feb.-March 1969, at 27.
The Needfor Education in the Law of CriminalCorrection, 2 VAL.
U.L. REV. 84 (1967).
Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners: The Allocation for
Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895 (1966) (with A.C.

Sofaer).
The New Role of Deense Counsel Under Escobedo and Miranda,
52 A.B.A.J. 1117 (1966).
Renaissance of the CriminalLaw. The Responsibility of the Trial
Lawyer, 4 DUQ. U.L. REV. 213 (1965).
Law School Trainingin CriminalLaw: A Judge's View, 3 A. CRIM.
L.Q. 166 (1965).
Sentencing the Income Tax Violator: Statement ofBasic Problem,
30 F.R.D. 197 (1962).
FREE SPEECH
Politicsand the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976).
Deamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know. A National
Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEx. L. REv. 630 (1968).
FairTrial-FreePress, 38 F.R.D. 435 (1966).

FreePressand Television-Free Trial, 5 PUBLISHING

ENTERTAIN-

L.Q. 419 (1966) (transcript of
a panel discussion in which Judge Wright participated).
A Judge's View. The News Media and CriminalJustice, 50 A.B.A.J.
1125 (1964).
MENT, ADVERTISING AND ALLIED FIELDS

ROLE OF THE COURTS
A Colleague's Tribute to Judge David L. Bazelon, on the TwentyFf/th Anniversary of his Appointment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 250 (1974).
ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition, andthe Supreme Court,
84 HARv. L. REV. 769 (1971).
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The Scholars and the Supreme Court, 26 REc. A.B. N.Y.C. 567
(1971).
The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1968).
The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
WAYNE L. REv. 317 (1967).
Act 85-554 of 1958 and the Disposal of the JudicialPower of the
United States, 6 LA. B.J. 147(1958).
CIVIL RIGHTS AND DESEGREGATION
Are the CourtsAbandoning the Cities?, 4 J. L. & EDUC. 218 (1975).
Promises to Keep, 3 BLACK L.J. 106 (1974).
"No Matter How Small," 58 MASS. L.Q. 9 (1973), 2 HuMAN
RIGHTS 115 (1972).
Poverty, Minorities, andRespectfor Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 425.
Symposium in Memory of Martin Luther King, Jr., 68 COLUM. L.
REv. 1046 (1968).
Public School Desegregation: Legal Remediesfor De Facto Segregation, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 478 (1965), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 285 (1965).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Rulemaking and JudicialReview, 30 AD. L. REv. 461 (1978).
New JudicialRequisitesfor Informal Rulemaking: Implicationsfor
the EnvironmentalImpact Statement Process,29 AD. L. REv. 59 (1977).
Court ofAppeals Review ofFederalRegulatoryAgency Rulemaking,
26 AD. L. REv. 199 (1974).
The Courtsand the Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
PretrialConference (in Seminar on Practice and Procedure), 28
F.R.D. 141 (1961).
Pre-Trialon Trial, 14 LA. L. REv. 391 (1954).
OpeningRemarks (in Open Forum: Evaluationofa PersonalInjury
Casefor Settlement Purposes), 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 267 (1956).
ADMIRALITY
Justice at the Dock: The Maritime Worker and Mr. Justice Black
Thirty Years in Retrospect, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 524 (1967).
Jurisdictionin the Tidelands, 32 TUL. L. REv. 175 (1958).

